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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 2, 1999, a Florida man identifying himself as
"hchero" attempted to auction one of his functioning kidneys by
posting it on eBay.com for a starting bid of $25,000.1 Before eBay
officials shut down the auction, the highest bid had reached
$5,750,100.2
Nearly every country in the world is experiencing a growing
shortage of transplantable kidneys.3 In the United States, where
shortages of kidneys are far greater than for any other
transplanted organ,4 the chances of patients with chronic renal
failure receiving a kidney transplant are slim to none.'
Currently, over 77,000 patients in the United States are waiting
on the national transplant list s to receive one of only 15,000
1. Kelly Lobas, Living Organ Donations: How Can Society Ethically Increase the
Supply of Organs?, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 475, 502-03 (2006); Amy Harmon, Auction
for a Kidney Pops Up on Ebay's Site, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1999, at A13.
2. Lobas, supra note 1, at 502-03. Lines and long waits predictably form in
markets when prices are capped or sales are forbidden. Posting of Richard A. Epstein to
The University of Chicago Law School Faculty Blog, Organ Donations: Sorting or
Queuing?, http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2006/05/organ-donations.html (May 31,
2006, 15:29 CST).
3. "A shortage is defined as an excess of the quantity of a good demanded over the
quantity supplied at a given price." T. Randolph Beard & David L. Kaserman, On the
Ethics of Paying Organ Donors: An Economics Perspective, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 827, 828
(2006). Long lines for kidney transplants commonly exist in other countries besides the
United States. See Gary S. Becker & Julio Jorge Elias, Introducing Incentives in the
Market for Live and Cadaveric Organ Donations, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2007,
at 3, 7-8 (illustrating that Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom all have large waits
for organs); Madhav Goyal et al., Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a Kidney
in India, 288 J. AM. MED. AsS'N 1589, 1589 (2002) ("INJearly every country has a shortage
of kidneys for transplantation."). Between 15%--30% of European patients on a waitlist for
a kidney die before receiving a transplant. Cathy Johnson, Eastern Europeans Selling
Kidneys for Cash, ABC SCI. ONLINE, Aug. 7, 2003, http://www.abc.net.au/
science/news/stories/2003/917832.htm. Approximately 50,000 people worldwide die each
year waiting for a kidney. Michael Finkel, Complications, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2001,
(Magazine), at 26.
4. See Michael B. Gill & Robert M. Sade, Paying for Kidneys: The Case Against
Prohibition, 12 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 17, 18 (2002) (noting that the "discrepancy
between kidney supply and need is the greatest" of all organs). Of the patients awaiting
organ transplants, those needing a kidney transplant are among the ones most likely to
die waiting, followed by those anticipating liver and heart transplants, respectively. See
MICHELE GOODWIN, BLACK MARKETS: THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF BODY PARTS 43 (2006)
(displaying that, since 1996, more people have died from kidney failure on the waitlist
than any other individual organ).
5. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 186 (showing that kidney demand increases
yearly while the donations, both living and deceased, remain steady); E.A. Friedman &
A.L. Friedman, Payment for Donor Kidneys: Pros and Cons, 69 KIDNEY INT'L 960, 960-61
(2006), available at http://www.nature.com/ki/journal/v69/n6/full/5000262a.html (noting
that "17 people die each day waiting for transplants that cannot take place because of the
shortage of donated organs").
6. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, httpJ/www.optn.org/
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kidneys,7 and the number of waitlist patients is expected to reach
100,000 within a few years.8 Because the average wait time has
increased to five years,9 seven percent of patients on the list die
each year before ever receiving a kidney.10 The list is about
double the length it was just one decade ago," and the ratio of
recipients to donors continues to grow more disparate each year.12
latestDatalrptData.asp (follow "DATA" tab; then follow "View Data Reports" hyperlink;
then follow "National Data" hyperlink; select "candidates;" then follow the "Overall by
Organ" hyperlink; then follow "kidney" hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 31, 2009). This
number does not include renal patients never added to the waitlist, those who died on
dialysis, or others with limited access to medical care. Michele Goodwin, Altruism's
Limits: Law, Capacity, and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 311 (2004).
7. Goyal et al., supra note 3, at 1589.
8. Sean Arthurs, Comment, No More Circumventing the Dead: The Least-Cost
Model Congress Should Adopt to Address the Abject Failure of Our National Organ
Donation Regime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1110-11 (2005).
9. On average, patients waiting for a cadaveric organ spend between five and
seven years on the waitlist. Abdallah S. Daar, The Case for a Regulated System of Living
Kidney Sales, 2 NATURE CLINICAL PRAC. 600, 600 (2006), available at
http://www.nature.com/ncpneph/journal/v2/nll/pdf/ncpneph0320.pdf; see also Larry
Rohter, Tracking the Sale of a Kidney on a Path of Poverty and Hope, N.Y. TIMES, May 23,
2004, at Ni (mentioning an average wait time of five years). Every four hours, one
candidate on the list dies awaiting a kidney transplant. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 44. Of
those who live to see their turn for a transplant, many have become too weak and are no
longer in the physical condition suitable to withstand organ transplantation. The average
wait for a kidney transplant is estimated to exceed ten years by the end of this decade.
Finkel, supra note 3, at 31.
10. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 7,43 (noting that every day 18 patients die while
on the UNOS organ waitlist before the anticipated organ is ever transplanted, and every
day 110 patients are added to the list); Daar, supra note 9, at 600 (commenting that of the
90,000 patients on the waitlist, 6,000 die each year). "Between 1989 and 1992,... 10,000
people died while waiting for an organ transplant." Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcorn,
To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES
L. & MED. 213, 227 (2001); see also UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING ETHICS COMM.,
FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR ORGAN DONATION: A REPORT OF THE PAYMENT
SUBCOMMITTEE, http://www.unos.org(Resources/bioethics.asp?index=3 [hereinafter UNOS
REPORT] (noting that in 1992 alone, 2,567 patients died while waiting for an organ
transplant); Arthur J. Matas & David E.R. Sutherland, The Importance of Innovative
Efforts to Increase Organ Donation, 294 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1691, 1691 (2005)
(acknowledging a death rate of 7% per year on the waitlist); Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?,
ECONOMIST, Nov. 16, 2006, at 15, (proclaiming that in 2005, 4,039 patients died while on
the waitlist); Rohter, supra note 9, at 8 (noting that in 2003, approximately 3,300 out of
60,000 patients died while waiting for a kidney). The number of patients who die on the
waitlist actually understates the number of patients affected by the kidney shortage
because many patients are removed from the list when they become too weak to
withstand transplantation. See DAVID L. KASERMAN & A.H. BARNETT, THE U.S. ORGAN
PROCUREMENT SYSTEM: A PRESCRIPTION FOR REFORM 34 (2002).
11. From 1993 to 2003, the number of kidney transplant candidates in the United
States increased from 19,046 to 47,831. Arthur J. Matas et al., Morbidity and Mortality
After Living Kidney Donation, 1999-2001: Survey of United States Transplant Centers, 3
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 830, 831 (2003). "As of July 17, 2005, 62,550 Americans waited
for kidneys." GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 44; see id. at 42 (showing that from 1994 to 2003,
the kidney waitlist grew from 25,852 to 57,211).
12. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 42.
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Moreover, the longer patients are forced to wait before receiving
these transplants, the greater the costs grow in keeping these
individuals alive on dialysis.,
In this Article, I discuss the current approaches to treating
kidney disease and focus on the most viable of the alternatives-
kidney transplants. After reviewing the current medical
literature, I examine the most controversial, yet most promising,
option for providing sufficient kidney transplants for all who
need them-paying donors. Thereafter, I present an analysis of
religious thought on paying kidney donors, with a focus on the
most jurisprudential religion-Judaism. I then discuss the other
significant medical, ethical, and economic arg-uments both in
favor of and against this proposal, and provide throughout my
analysis of each of these arguments. I conclude that paying
kidney donors is proper and would alleviate the needless
suffering that currently occurs as a result of the severe shortage
of transplantable kidneys that exists in our current donation-
60000- l
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.2 Kidney Candidates20000- 
10000-
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GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 44. The median number of days spent on the national waitlist
for a transplantable kidney has increased substantially. Id.; see also Christy M. Watkins,
A Deadly Dilemma: The Failure of Nations' Organ Procurement Systems and Potential
Reform Alternatives 4 (The Berkeley Electronic Press, Working Paper No. 304, 2004),
available at http://Ilaw.bepress.com/expresso/eps/304 (noting that the waiting time has
increased 141% from 1988 to 1995). The wait for a donor kidney in 1994 was 836 days; by
2000, the wait had increased to 1,199 days. GOoDWItN, supra note 4, at 44; Matas et al,
supra note 11, at 831 (noting that the median amount of time patients spent on the
waitlist for a kidney transplant from 1993 to 2003 increased from 514 days to more than
1,131 days). Moreover, the organ waitlist grew five times as fast as the number of organs
donated between 1990 and 1999. Finkel, supra note 3, at 31. One contributing factor to
the growing disparity might be the fact that insurance and third party coverage of organ
transplants became more common during the 1970s and 1980s, causing an increase in the
number of patients waiting for organ transplants. Margaret R. Sobota, Note The Price of
Life: $50,000 for an Egg, Why Not $1,500 for a Kidney? An Argument to Establish a
Market for Organ Procurement Similar to the Current Market for Hurnan Egg
Procurement, 82 WASH. U, L.Q. 1225, 1228 (2004).
13. See KASERMAN & BARNET'1, supra note 10, at 33-35.
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only system. Thereafter, I detail a proposal for creating a system
to regulate the sale of kidneys that enlists the existing nonprofit
kidney distribution organization to serve as a clearinghouse for
both the purchase and distribution of commercial kidneys. As
this Article will show, even though kidneys would be purchased
in a regulated market under this proposal, they would not be sold
through market mechanisms. Their distribution would occur the
very same way as today, based on need and matching criteria.
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO ADDRESSING KIDNEY DISEASE
The kidneys consist of two reddish-brown, bean shaped
organs located on both sides of the spine under the diaphragm. 4
They remove waste from the body through the urine and help
regulate blood pressure, volume, and electrolyte composition. 5
Kidney failure (a.k.a. renal failure) occurs when the kidneys
cannot adequately remove waste and maintain the correct
electrolyte balance. 6 Many disorders can cause chronic kidney
failure-typically resulting in various secondary problems such
as fatigue, a drop of red blood cells, and heart problems. 7 The
treatment for kidney failure is dialysis, transplantation, or both. s
A. Kidney Dialysis Is Insufficient
Dialysis performs the basic function of the kidneys by
essentially washing the patient's blood. 9 In 2006, more than
350,000 patients throughout the United States were routinely
undergoing dialysis treatment, and that number continues to
grow rapidly."0 Dialysis patients spend much of their time
struggling merely to survive.2'
14. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, Organ Datasource > Kidney,






19. MedlinePlus, Dialysis, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/dialysis.html (last
visited Jan. 31, 2009).
20. Richard Pdrez-Pefia, As Diabetes Destroys Kidneys, New York Lags in Dialysis
Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 28, 2006, at Al, (reporting that in 1980, less than 50,000 U.S.
patients were on routine kidney dialysis, but by 2006, the number of patients had
increased to more than 350,000). Furthermore, whereas diabetes was the leading cause of
kidney failure in 1980 for fewer than 6,000 of the patients on dialysis, in 2006, the
number of patients on dialysis as a result of diabetes approached 150,000. Id.
21. See id.
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"At a typical dialysis center, patients come in three times a
week, typically for four hours at a time. They sit in rows of
recliners, dozing, watching television-anything to take
their minds off the machines, needles, and tubes that
siphon blood from their bodies, clean it of impurities like
urea, and pump it back in.",
2
Burdening side effects include fatigue, cramps, and thirst-
making employment virtually impossible." A patient might lose
fifteen pounds in a single treatment session.24 Dialysis patients
are hospitalized fifteen days on average out of every year, during
which time roughly twenty percent die.25 "I want to say it's a
rough life, but it hardly is a life," explained Denise Bembury, a
patient in Brooklyn undergoing dialysis, "I wouldn't put this on
anybody."26 There are no rules governing who can own or operate
a dialysis center. While doctors manage some, individuals with
little background in healthcare control others.27
Perhaps most troubling, dialysis can only sustain a patient's
life for a limited time.2" Patients face an increasing risk of death
each year they remain on dialysis.29 And for those patients low on
the national waitlist for a kidney transplant, continued dialysis
results in diminished post-transplantation outcomes. °
Moreover, dialysis treatment is expensive-costing more
than $65,000 per patient per year, not including pharmaceutical
costs.31 Over the course of seven years, the average dialysis
patient will spend at least $450,000 for treatment.32 The federal
government supplements much of these expenses through
Medicare's End Stage Renal Disease Program.33
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Finkel, supra note 3, at 26.
25. Pdrez-Pefia, supra note 20.
26. Id. Faced with having to increase his time on dialysis before his kidney donor
came forward, playwright Neil Simon decided, "I didn't want to live my life anymore."
Sally Satel, Desperately Seeking a Kidney, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, (Magazine), at 62.
27. Prez-Pefia, supra note 20.
28. More than 20% of dialysis patients die each year. See Mark F. Anderson, The
Future of Organ Transplantation: From Where Will New Donors Come, To Whom Will
Their Organs Go?, 5 HEALTH MATRIX 249, 281 (1995).
29. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 10, at 33, 35 (discussing transplant
candidates' decreasing health and increased risk of death after time spent on dialysis);
Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment
for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1832 (2007) (stating those on transplant waitlists
have a 6% risk of death each year).
30. Matas & Sutherland, supra note 10, at 1691.
31. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 39, 158.
32. Id. at 159.
33. See id.
2009] 1535
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B. Kidney Transplants
Kidney transplants are the medically preferred alternative
to long-term dialysis for kidney failure. Performed for the first
time in 1936,"4 kidney transplants are the most common type of
organ transplant," and the procedure has been well studied.36
Since 1983, when doctors introduced the immunosuppressant
cyclosporin, transplantation has been the preferred method for
addressing chronic renal failure.37 Recent studies demonstrate
that kidney transplantation extends life well beyond that
expected from dialysis.38  The typical patient will live
approximately ten to fifteen years longer with a kidney
transplant than if she remained on dialysis.39 Patients who
receive a kidney transplant in their twenties can expect to live
thirty years longer than if they remained on dialysis.4" The life-
extending benefits inversely relate to age.4' Moreover, patients
34. Though ultimately unsuccessful, in 1936 surgeons performed the first kidney
transplant in the Soviet Union using a kidney taken from a cadaver. Harris & Alcorn,
supra note 10, at 214. Then, in 1947, surgeons temporarily stitched a kidney to a patient's
arm while the patient's original kidney took time to recover. In 1954, doctors performed
the first successful, permanent kidney transplant in Boston on Christmas Eve. Arthurs,
supra note 8, at 1104.
35. Gill & Sade, supra note 4, at 18. At least twenty-five human organs are
transplantable, including the kidneys, heart, lungs, and corneas. See Donny J. Perales,
Comment, Rethinking the Prohibition of Death Row Prisoners as Organ Donors: A
Possible Lifeline to Those on Organ Donor Waiting Lists, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 687, 688
(2003).
36. See Perales, supra note 35, at 689 ('Today, organ transplant surgery is no
longer considered an extremely risky procedure; instead medical professionals view it as a
common surgical operation.").
37. In 1983, when Swiss researchers discovered the compound immunosuppressant
cyclosporin in a Norwegian soil sample, transplantation quickly became the safest method
for addressing chronic renal failure. Cyclosporin blocks the body's natural rejection to the
transplanted organ without also shutting down the body's immunological defense against
other foreign bodies. As a result, transplant success rates surpassed 90%. Arthurs, supra
note 8, at 1104-05.
38. See Mordechai Halperin, Organ Transplants from Living Donors, in 1 JEWISH
MEDICAL ETHics 407, 407-08 (2004). Mortality rates of renal patients who timely receive
transplants are between 50-80% lower than those of renal patients who remain on
dialysis for long periods. See Becker & Elfas, supra note 3, at 15.
39. See Mordechai Halperin, On Selling Tissues and Organs, 8 B'OR HATORAH 45,
46 (1993) (suggesting that due to medical advances, kidney transplant patients generally
live longer); Matas & Sutherland, supra note 10, at 1691 ("The mortality rate decreases
dramatically following transplantation."); Gabriel C. Oniscu, Helen Brown & John L.R.
Forsythe, Impact of Cadaveric Renal Transplantation on Survival in Patients Listed for
Transplantation, 16 J. AM. SOcY OF NEPHROLOGY 1859, 1862 (2005) (concluding that the
average life span for those on dialysis was 5.84 years, compared with 17.19 years for
transplant patients).
40. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1832.
41. See Oniscu et al., supra note 39, at 1864 (illustrating that the life expectancy is
greater for younger transplant patients).
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who undergo kidney transplants generally have a better quality
of life when compared to those who remain on dialysis,42
regardless of the source of the organ donor. 3 In fact, "organ
transplantation often restores the patient's health to a level
approximating that experienced before the onset of the disease."'
The long-term success rate of a kidney transplant inversely
relates to the length of time a patient undergoes dialysis
treatment prior to the organ transplant. 5 Thus, transplant
patients forced to wait for long periods on dialysis are more likely
to be hospitalized and less likely to return to the workforce
following their transplant." "From the perspectives of the
recipient, donor and society, [preemptive renal transplantation]
is the optimal timing strategy, and should no longer be the
minority approach for patients eligible for this surgical procedure
with suitable donors."47  Indeed, going on dialysis before
transplantation may increase the probability of kidney
rejection; kidney grafts tend to last about one year longer when
patients receive immediate transplants without having to wait
three to four years on dialysis.49
Transplantation is not only better than dialysis for the
health of the patient, but it is also more cost effective. ° The costs
of kidney transplantation have steadily decreased, such that the
procedure has become far less expensive than dialysis.5' "The
long-term cost savings of kidney transplantation over dialysis are
42. See Goyal et al., supra note 3, at 1589 ("Compared with long-term dialysis, renal
transplantation generally offers a longer life span and a better quality of life.").
43. See L. Schlebusch, Depression and Self-Report Disclosure after Live Related
Donor and Cadaver Renal Transplants, 75 S. AFR. MED. J. 490, 493 (1989) (noting that
the enhanced quality of life experienced by patients is "irrespective of donor type").
44. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 10, at 2.
45. Id.; see also Becker & Elias, supra note 3, at 15 ("Longer waiting times on
dialysis negatively impact the success rate of transplantation and patient survival.").
46. See Anderson, supra note 28, at 253 & n.20 (explaining that dialysis often
makes the patients feel tired and anemic, which also leads to unemployment).
47. Kevin C. Mange & Matthew R. Weir, Preemptive Renal Transplantation: Why
Not?, 3 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1336, 1339 (2003).
48. KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 10, at 35.
49. See Becker & Elias, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that the average time to graft
failure increases when the patient undergoes a preemptive kidney transplant); Kevin C.
Mange, Marshall M. Joffe & Harold I. Feldman, Effect of the Use or Nonuse of Long-Term
Dialysis on the Subsequent Survival of Renal Transplants from Living Donors, 344 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 726, 730 (2001) (concluding that preemptive transplantation of kidneys was
associated with a significantly longer graft half-life).
50. The National Kidney Foundation of the United Kingdom has found that "kidney
transplantation is very cost effective." Beard & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 847.
51. Manikkam Suthanthiran & Terry B. Strom, Renal Transplantation, 331 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 365, 369 (1994). In 1994, patients were charged roughly $38,487 for a
kidney transplant (calculated in 1988 dollars). Id.
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well known," says the American Diabetes Association.52
Beginning one year after transplantation, the costs associated
with patient care are approximately one-third what they are for
long-term dialysis patients." Indeed, "the financial break-even
point for transplantation is reached only 2.7 years after a kidney
graft."54 Whereas dialysis costs for a patient average $450,000 for
treatments, the costs for kidney transplantation approximate
$90,000."s Many have been quick to notice the potential savings,56
which have been projected by one scholar to be over $1 billion per
57year.
1. The Science of Transplantation. Successful kidney
transplants require blood-type compatibility between the donor
and recipient, a high number of shared human leukocyte
antigens (HLA), and "crossmatching" (discussed below).5" After
blood typing, doctors evaluate whether the donor's and patient's
tissue match genetically. 9 People have blood and tissue proteins
called antigens-HLAs-that are distinguishable like blood
types. ° Kidney transplant doctors examine six specific HLAs in
each donor and recipient to determine the level of tissue
matching.61 The long-term success of kidney transplantation
52. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 847.
53. See Robert Gaston et al., Racial Equity in Renal Transplantation: The Disparate
Impact of HLA-Based Allocation, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT
DEBATE 308, 309 (Arthur L. Caplan & Daniel H. Coelho eds., 1998) (citing Paul W. Eggers,
Effect of Transplantation on the Medicare End-Stage Renal Disease Program, 318 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 223, 223-29 (1988)).
54. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 847 ("After 2.7 years, the medical system
saves about $27,000 per year for each patient who has a transplant instead of remaining
on dialysis.").
55. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 159. Additional costs for the transplant patient
include two years of immunosuppressant medications totaling $16,000 each year.
Afterwards, the transplant patient and his or her health provider save roughly $8,000 per
year in dialysis costs. Id. Kidney transplants cost, on average, $100,000 less than long-
term dialysis. Volokh, supra note 29, at 1839.
56. See Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1111 (illustrating the rapid increase of names on
the waitlist).
57. Avoiding the costs of dialysis for 3,469 renal patients ($1,192,642,000) plus
preventing 218 unnecessary deaths ($149,548,000) nets an overall savings of
$1,342,190,000. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 848.
58. Thomas Peters, Kidney Transplant Matching: What It Means,
http://www.aakp.org/aakp-library/Kidney-Transplant-Matchingindex.cfm (last visited
Jan. 31, 2009) (explaining that a kidney transplant requires blood-type matching, tissue
(antigen) matching, and crossmatching to be successful).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The HLA system "is controlled by genes on the short arm of chromosome six.
The HLA loci are part of the genetic region known as the Major Histocompatibility
Complex .... The essential role of the HLA antigens lies in the control of self-recognition
KIDNEYS, CASH, & KASHRUT
historically has been directly related to the level of antigen
compatibility between the donor and recipient." However, while
the best long-term outcomes may occur with a patient and donor
who share all HLAs, i.e., a six-antigen match,
immunosuppressives (anti-rejection drugs) now greatly reduce
the importance of HLAs matches.63 Further, even when all six
HLAs match perfectly, the recipient must still undergo
continuous immunosuppressive treatment to prevent his or her
body's immune system from attacking the newly transplanted
64organ.
Crossmatching is the last test performed on a kidney donor
and a particular recipient. "The basic crossmatch test involves a
mixing of cells and serum to determine whether or not the
recipient of a kidney will respond to the transplanted organ by
attempting to reject it.""s These tests have contributed to the
overall success of kidney transplantation today.66
Those patients living in the United States with end-stage
renal disease (ESRD),67 the stage of kidney disease requiring
intervention, who choose to undergo a transplant rather than
remain on dialysis have two options for kidney transplants:
61
cadaveric or living.
2. Cadaveric Kidney Transplants. ESRD patients in need
of a kidney typically receive kidneys in America from cadaveric
kidney donors-i.e., brain-dead donors whose organs are
and thus defense against microorganisms." U. Shankarkumar, The Human Leukocyte
Antigen (HLA) System, 4 INT. J. HUM. GENETICS 91, 91 (2004).
62. See Suthanthiran & Strom, supra note 51, at 369 (concluding that HLA-
identical grafts had estimated half-lives of 26.9 years compared to 12.2 (for a sibling) and
10.8 (for a parent) for mismatched grafts). For patients who receive cadaveric organs, the
benefits of HLA-matched kidneys are significant. The half-life of HLA-matched grafts was
17.3 years compared to 7.8 years for a mismatched graft. Id.; see also CATHERINE LYONS,
ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE MORAL ISSUES 102 (1970) (stating that there is very strong
reason to believe that "when a donor is unrelated, selection of the recipient on the basis of
the tissue match can improve the prognosis" (quoting Rushing Donor Organs Across
Europe's Borders, MED. WORLD NEWS, July 18, 1969, at 28-29)).
63. Peters, supra note 58.
64. Even when the patient and donor share all six antigens, other factors may
cause the organ to be rejected. See John T. Makley & Richard Nicholas, Clinical Aspects of
Allograft Tissue, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 36, 37
(Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 2004).
65. Peters, supra note 58.
66. Id.
67. The leading cause of ESRD is insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus in European
Americans, hypertensive nephrosclerosis in African Americans, and chronic
glomerulonephritis in Hispanics and Asians. Suthanthiran & Strom, supra note 51, at
368.
68. Matas & Sutherland, supra note 10, at 1691.
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harvested for transplantation. 9 Both the donor's cause of death
and the health of his or her organs potentially limit the pool of
cadaveric organ donors. Only a small percentage of individuals
die in such a way that is conducive to cadaveric organ
donations. ° Ideally, the donor died in the hospital after an
accident (e.g., car or motorcycle) so that nothing directly impairs
donor organ functioning.7 In addition, ideal donors are younger
than fifty-five with kidneys that are free from infection and
debilitating diseases." Cadaveric donor organs must be quickly
removed and stored in appropriate medical facilities. Unless
these organs are transplanted within several hours of storage,
they run the risk of suffering permanent damage and becoming
unfit for transplantation.73 The surgeon typically only has sixty
minutes after a donor's death to retrieve the kidneys,74 after
which the kidneys must be delivered to the appropriate
transplant center within eight hours of procurement.75 Thus, only
69. See Goyal et al., supra note 3, at 1589 (noting that cadaveric donors include, for
example, brain-dead victims of car accidents); see also Gaston et al., supra note 53, at 308
(declaring that each year more than 23,000 Americans await a suitable cadaveric kidney);
Andrew S. Levey et al., Kidney Transplantation from Unrelated Living Donors: Time to
Reclaim a Discarded Opportunity, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT
DEBATE, supra note 53, at 48, 48-49 (mentioning that most kidney transplantations in the
past involved cadaveric kidneys because there was no risk of subsequent death to the
donor).
70. Lloyd R. Cohen, Directions for the Disposition of My Vital Organs, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 805, 806 (2006) (stating that fewer than 25,000 individuals per year could make
suitable organ donors). In fact, only 1% of individuals die in a way that would make them
suitable organ donors. See KASERMAN & BARNETT, supra note 10, at 9. And, this number
decreases even more when analyzing potential availability, such that "[ilt is estimated
that 30 to 50 cadaveric kidneys per million population are potentially available annually."
Suthanthiran & Strom, supra note 51, at 368; see also Anderson, supra note 28, at 252
(observing that "only certain of the deceased are appropriate donors"); CARLYLE C. RING,
JR. & SHELDON KURTZ, REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, REVISED UNIFORM
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 2 (2005), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uaga/
2005AMAnatomicalReport.htm ("Only a small percentage of potential donors die under
circumstances that permit organ donation.").
71. Shelby E. Robinson, Comment, Organs For Sale? An Analysis of Proposed
Systems for Compensating Organ Providers, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1019, 1023 (1999). I have
met several doctors who routinely refer to motorcycles as "donor-cycles." Notwithstanding
the gallows humor, the description is often accurate, because motorcycle drivers involved
in fatal accidents are usually relatively young and were, prior to death, fairly healthy.
72. David E. Jefferies, Note, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure
the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 626 (1998) ("[Ilt is preferable that
cadavers be brain dead, but still have a beating heart, be younger than fifty-five, and have
an organ free from infection or metastatic cancer.").
73. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1105-06.
74. Robert Steinbrook, Organ Donation After Cardiac Death, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED.
209, 210 (2007).
75. Zero antigen mismatch kidneys must be offered to the appropriate recipient
transplant centers within eight hours of organ procurement for standard donors and four
hours for expanded criteria donors. United Network for Organ Sharing, Organ
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a very narrow timeframe exists during which a recipient must be
matched with the organ, arrive at the hospital, and be readied for
surgery.76 Under these circumstances, recipients cannot undergo
any significant presurgery anti-rejection medical treatment.
ESRD patients on the national waitlist remain there until a
matching cadaveric kidney is received; they get a kidney from a
living donor through their own means; they get too ill to receive a
transplant; or they die.77
Unfortunately, only twenty-five to fifty percent of even
potential cadaveric donors ever become organ donors. 8 In 1968,
the National Conference Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL) made an effort to increase the donations of cadaveric
organs by drafting the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA),
which provides uniform regulation of organ donation and
encourages cadaveric organ volunteerism." The Patient Self
Determination Act of 1991 requires hospitals to inform potential
donors and their families of the option to designate whether or
not they would like to donate their organs at death. ° The UAGA
left the decision as to whether to donate organs upon death to
each individual.8 The UAGA, a version of which has been
adopted in every state,82 provides that all persons over the age of
eighteen may designate his or her organs by will or by another
instrument for donation after death.83 As a result, every state
Distribution: Allocation of Deceased Kidneys, Policy 3.5.3.5 (2008), available at
http://www.unos.orgtpoliciesandbylaws/policies.asp?resources=true.
76. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1106.
77. "[Tlhe national organ transplant waiting list.., is more accurately a pool of
individuals who have been referred for organ transplantation and are waiting to receive
deceased donor organs." Daniel T. Stimson, Private Solicitation of Organ Donors: A Threat
to the Fairness of the U.S. Organ Transplant System, or a Solution to the National Organ
Shortage?, 10 MICH. ST. J. MED. & L. 349, 355 (2006).
78. See KASERMAN & BARNErr, supra note 10, at 11.
79. Stimson, supra note 77, at 352-53; see also GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 111
(noting that the UAGA addresses deceased organ donations only). The comment to section
10 of the 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) provides as follows:
Altruism and a desire to benefit other members of the community are important
moral reasons which motivate many to donate. Any perception on the part of the
public that transplantation unfairly benefits those outside the community, those
who are wealthy enough to afford transplantation, or that it is undertaken
primarily with an eye toward profit rather than therapy will severely imperil the
moral foundations, and thus the efficacy of the system.
UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10 cmt., 8A U.L.A. 62 (1987).
80. See Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1113.
81. Id. at 1107.
82. Every state adopted some version of the UAGA by 1973. Steve P. Calandrillo,
Cash for Kidneys? Utilizing Incentives to End America's Organ Shortage, 13 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 69, 78 (2004).
83. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GFT ACT §§ 2, 4, 8A U.L.A. 39-41, 45 (2006). Section 2 of
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currently maintains organ donor registries, most of which involve
either checking a box on one's driver's license application or
filling out a donor card."4 When an individual fails explicitly to
make his or her wishes known before death, the UAGA provides
that family members may step in to make the decision for him or
her. 5
To further this effort, amendments were made to the UAGA
in 1987 both preventing relatives from revoking the decision of a
deceased family member to donate his or her organs"8 and
allowing the family to choose to donate the organs if the deceased
had not expressly indicated a refusal to donate." Furthermore,
the amendments state that medical personnel may no longer be
held criminally or civilly liable as long as they acted in good faith
pursuant to the UAGA and other state laws.8 Although the
UAGA forbids payment to individuals for donating cadaveric
organs, it does not mention anything about reimbursing living
donors 89
In the past, many European countries, and just recently
several South American countries, have adopted a presumed
consent model for procuring organs for transplant.9" Accordingly,
those countries presume that, unless specified in writing,
individuals agree to donate their organs at the time of death."
Under this model, individuals must affirmatively opt out to
retain their organs upon death.
France adopted a presumed consent model in 1976, with the
passage of the Caillavet Law, a statute requiring that all adults
the UAGA states that "[any individual of sound mind and 18 years of age or more may
give all or any part of his body for any purpose specified .... the gift to take effect upon
death." UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.L.A. 116 (1968), superseded by UNIF.
ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2, 8A U.L.A. 24-25 (1987). See also GOODWIN, supra note 4, at
178 (stating that body parts of a single cadaver can be worth more than $220,000).
84. Stimson, supra note 77, at 352.
85. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1107 (citing UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(a) (1968),
8A U.L.A. 116 (2003)).
86. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(h), 8A U.L.A. 2 (1987); see also Calandrillo,
supra note 82, at 78 (noting that "the statute was simplified to ensure that the donor's
wishes were followed upon death rather than overridden by her next of kin").
87. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3(a), 8A U.L.A. 3 (1987).
88. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 11(c), 8A U.L.A. 11 (1987).
89. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 223.
90. Id. at 224. Primarily, European countries have been the ones to implement the
presumed consent model for procuring organs. Robinson, supra note 71, at 1031.
91. See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 224; Robinson, supra note 71, at 1031.
Jim Cohan, a U.S. transplant coordinator, sometimes organizes transplants in countries
that have presumed consent laws to take advantage of the greater availability of organs.
Telephone Interview with Jim Cohan, U.S. Transplant Coordinator, in Sun Valley, Cal.
(Jan. 29, 2009).
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donate their organs at death unless they have affirmatively opted
out during their lifetime.92 Specifically, the Caillavet Law states:
Organs may be removed for therapeutic or scientific
purposes from cadavers of persons who have not, during
their lifetime, indicated their refusal to permit such a
procedure. However, where the cadaver is that of a minor or
of an incompetent person, organs may be removed for
transplantation purposes only with the authorization of the
person's legal representative.9
Some justify a presumed consent model through social
contract theory,94 requiring sacrifices for the "common good." 5
Despite an increase in the number of France's postmortem
donors after enactment of the Caillavet Law, the presumed
consent model fails to eliminate France's organ shortages,96 as
have similar models in other countries.97
A few countries reserve the right to harvest the organs of
their constituents at the time of death regardless of whether or
not they have received the donor's consent.98 China and Serbia,
for example, remove the organs of executed prisoners.9  Officially
sanctioned under Chinese law in 1984, the procedure is allowed
in China under one of three circumstances: "(1) if the prisoner's
body is not claimed; (2) if the prisoner has consented; or (3) if the
prisoner's family has consented."00 The U.S. State Department
has expressed concern, however, that prisoners and their families
are not given an opportunity to give meaningful consent.'
92. Jefferies, supra note 72, at 636.
93. Id. (citation omitted).
94. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 133-34 (explaining the presumed consent
proponent's argument that the policy "maximizes a community good for the benefit of all
people, with a relatively small collective burden").
95. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905) (explaining the concept of
"the common good" in the context of a challenge to the state's compulsory vaccination
law).
96. See Jefferies, supra note 72, at 637 (noting that twelve years after the passage of
the Caillavet Law, France still had relatively long waitlists for each transplantable
organ).
97. In 1998, Austria's presumed consent model produced only 270 transplant
kidneys, a relatively small number in comparison to the 1,116 waiting patients. Id. at 639.
98. See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 225 (referring to this type of system as a
"nationalization of cadavers").
99. Id.
100. Jefferies, supra note 72, at 642-43.
101. See Organs for Sale: China's Growing Trade and Ultimate Violation of
Prisoner's Rights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Operations and Human
Rights of the H. Comm. on International Relations, 107th Cong. 10-11 (2001) (statement
of Michael E. Parmly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
Democracy, Humans Rights, and Labor) (expressing concern that the Chinese system of
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The "mandated choice" model-not implemented
anywhere-offers an alternative to the presumed consent
model and its requirement that individuals wishing to keep
their organs at death must opt out. It requires people either to
opt in or to opt out of keeping their organs when they die. °2
That is, they must make an affirmative choice one way or the
other about whether to donate.0 3 Individual preference would
be recorded on tax forms or driver's licenses.0 4 However, the
costs and logistics of recording and later honoring every
person's individual donation preferences typically prove
prohibitive."15
In yet another model, advocates propose a futures market for
organ procurement, wherein potential donors receive payment for
entering an agreement during their lifetime to give over the
rights to remove their organs upon death."6 Such a program
would enable donors to sell removal rights to their organs in
advance of death for harvest after death or to agree to sell their
organs at death with all proceeds going to their heirs.0 7 Much of
the compensation paid out to potential donors in the first variant,
however, would be wasted because most cadaveric kidneys prove
unusable for transplantation.'8
In the United States, even though the UAGA has
simplified the process for donating cadaveric organs, °9 roughly
half of the potential cadaveric donations take place each
year."' Other recent initiatives increased the public's
knowledge of the importance and ease of electing to be organ
donors,"' but these efforts too have had little effect on the
number of cadaveric donations"2 and have failed to satisfy the
imprisonment contributes to the lack of meaningful consent by a prisoner's family).
102. Robinson, supra note 71, at 1034.
103. Id. at 1032 (discussing the lack of choice inherent in a presumed consent
system).
104. Id. at 1034.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1037.
107. DAViD D. FRIEDMAN, LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS TO Do WITH LAW AND
WHY IT MATTERS 242 (2000).
108. Robinson, supra note 71, at 1043 (calling a futures market for organs "vastly
inefficient").
109. Stimson, supra note 77, at 353.
110. Anderson, supra note 28, at 256; Volokh, supra note 29, at 1832-33.
111. See Matas & Sutherland, supra note 10, at 1691 (listing numerous efforts to
raise awareness for organ donation through public relations campaigns, improvements in
the consent process, and other innovative means).
112. See Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1114 (acknowledging that in 1996, the "waves of
public initiatives" increased the donation rate by 1% while the waitlist grew by 250%);
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growing demand for kidney transplants."' This, however, is
not an indictment of these programs. The critical issue is that
even if all eligible cadaveric donors donated, the kidney supply
would still fall far short of the number of kidneys needed to
meet the demand of the American population with kidney
failure seeking a transplant.114 If potential cadaveric organ
donors were fully exhausted as a supply source for organ
transplants, the current number of cadaveric organ donations
would likely only double.
115
3. The Cadaveric Kidney Distribution System. Initially,
and through the early 1980s, a disorganized assortment of
groups called organ procurement organizations (OPOs),
created by individual hospitals equipped with transplant
centers, oversaw the procurement and allocation of transplant
organs."' Without any federal supervision for allocating the
organs or organizing patient and donor data, these OPOs
collected cadaveric transplant organs from local hospitals and
transplanted them into their own patients."7 This local
arrangement continued for more than a decade."'
Matas & Sutherland, supra note 10, at 1691.
113. See Robert D. Truog, The Ethics of Organ Donation by Living Donors, 353 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 444, 444 (2005) (arguing that cadaveric organs have failed to meet the
growing demand for organ transplants). Even with the marketing efforts encouraging
people to sign donor cards, between 1990 and 1999 the organ waitlist grew five times as
fast as the number of organs donated. Finkel, supra note 3, at 31; see also UNOS REPORT,
supra note 10 ("Few could argue that the number of cadaveric organs procured by the
current system has failed to meet the demands that exist today."); Friedman & Friedman,
supra note 5, at 960 (explaining that state driver's license registries, together with
intensive public relations campaigns, celebrity endorsements, and National Kidney
Foundation efforts, have done nothing over the past decade to significantly increase the
number of cadaveric kidneys transplants performed in the United States).
114. See Matas & Sutherland, supra note 10, at 1691 (noting that even "if all
potential deceased donors became actual deceased donors, there would still be a shortage
of organs").
115. David Kaserman, Markets for Organs: Myths and Misconceptions, 18 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 567, 568 (2002); see also KASERMAN & BARNET', supra note
10, at 4 ("Given the likely number of potential cadaveric organ donors, a more effective
procurement policy could, in principle, increase collections by two- or even threefold.").
116. Stimson, supra note 77, at 354-55.
117. Martha W. Anderson & Scott Bottenfield, Tissue Banking-Past, Present, and
Future, in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 14, 20 (Stuart
J. Youngner et al. eds., 2004). Until 1985, each organ procurement organization (OPO)
drafted its own allocation and procurement policies. Because OPOs typically served only a
single transplant hospital, surgeons within each hospital were usually the ones to resolve
whatever ethical issues arose. Even in larger cities like Boston, New York City, Dallas,
and Los Angeles, allocation and procurement issues were resolved without federal
oversight. Jeffrey Prottas, Ethics of Allocation: Lessons from Organ Procurement History,
in TRANSPLANTING HUMAN TISSUE: ETHICS, POLICY, AND PRACTICE, supra, at 120, 121.
118. Prottas, supra note 117, at 121.
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However, in the early 1980s, success rates of transplant
procedures improved such that the demand for organ transplants
began to overwhelm the supply of organs that were available."9
Both "'a series of public appeals by desperate families seeking
organs and financial assistance for transplants' and 'the
appearance of a commercial market for transplant organs'
helped Congress identify organ allocation problems that
desperately needed addressing.'
Pursuant to the National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA),
Congress created the Organ Procurement and Transplantation
Network (OPTN) to streamline the allocation of organs
throughout the country"' and chose the United Network for
Organ Sharing (UNOS), a central registry of potential kidney
recipients, to administer the OPTN"' UNOS is a private,
nonprofit group operating out of Richmond, Virginia and is
dedicated to raising the number of organ donors. 3 It primarily
oversees the national organ transplant waitlist.2 4 Under contract
with the Department of Health and Human Services, UNOS
links up all the transplant centers and regional OPOs to a
centralized computer system.125 Whereas transplant hospitals
were initially given the option of OPTN membership, the
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 made federal funding
for Medicaid and Medicare contingent upon compliance with
UNOS allocation policies.'26
119. Id.
120. Robinson, supra note 71, at 1028 (quoting Ann McIntosh, Regulating the "Gift of
Life"--The 1987 Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 65 WASH. L. REV. 171, 174 (1990)).
121. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) Charter, Art. II,
http://www.optn.org/ContentDocuments/OPTNCHARTER II - NOV_04.doc (last visited
Jan. 28, 2009) ("The primary purposes of the OPTN are to operate and monitor an
equitable system for allocating organs donated for transplantation; maintain a waiting
list of potential recipients; match potential recipients with organ donors according to
established medical criteria for allocation of organs and, to the extent feasible, for listing
and de-listing transplant patients; facilitate the efficient, effective placement of organs for
transplantation; and increase organ donation."). Title II of the National Organ Transplant
Act (NOTA) established the OPTN to help pair donor organs with the most suitable organ
recipients anywhere in the United States. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1108.
122. United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS), Organ Donation and
Transplantation, http'//www.unos.org/whoWeAre/theOPTN.asp (last visited Jan. 31,
2009).
123. Steinbrook, supra note 74, at 210.
124. Stimson, supra note 77, at 350-51, 355.
125. Watkins, supra note 12, at 11.
126. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 97 (stating that OPOs and all hospitals performing
transplant operations must adhere to UNOS allocation policies to receive Medicaid and
Medicare funding).
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Transplant centers decide which patients will get onto the
waitlist by running candidates through a series of tests to
evaluate their social support system and health. 27 Every time
one of the regional OPOs receives a transplantable organ,
prospective recipients on the waitlist are ranked according to
criteria that UNOS has specified, "including blood type, HLA
type,'28 length of time waiting [on the list], medical urgency, and
distance from the donor" in order to determine which candidate
will receive the organ transplant.
129
Due to the overwhelming shortage of kidneys, often more
than one transplant candidate turns out medically compatible
with and ready to receive a particular kidney.3 ' When this
happens, transplant personnel must further prioritize patients,
and they do this by assessing their social worth.' "Criteria
include some family-related considerations such as marital
status and number of dependents; other criteria are income,
educational background, employment record, relationship to
authority figures, past irresponsible behavior, and
intelligence."'32 Rather than paying for their transplant organ
with cash, recipients must pay for it with time, "' often more of it
than they have to spend.' A policy that chooses which patients
live and die based on their social status likely results in
inequitable outcomes."' And, while giving priority to patients
with medical urgency or waitlist seniority typically directs
transplants to patients who are in the most immediate need,
127. Watkins, supra note 12, at 11.
128. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 102-03 ("UNOS has developed a process that
prioritizes kidney transplants based on HLA matching between donor and recipient. A
point value system is used to determine the compatibility or 'matching' between a kidney
donor and her potential recipient. The system strongly favors a perfect match over all
other possible combinations .. ").
129. Stimson, supra note 77, at 355. Similar to its authorization of UJNOS, NOTA's
provisions allow for the establishment of the National Marrow Donor Program (NMDP).
UNOS regulates the allocation of transplant organs from deceased donors, and the NMDP
oversees bone marrow transplants from living donors. However, instead of maintaining a
list of prospective transplant recipients as UNOS does, the NMDP maintains a national
registry of prospective transplant donors that can be searched for HLA compatibility each
time there is a patient who needs a bone marrow transplant. Id. at 356.
130. Jefferies, supra note 72, at 626.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Posting of Richard A. Epstein, supra note 2. Often, however, the time patients
spend on the waitlist amounts to deadweight loss because many of them receive nothing
in return. Id.
134. See Michele Goodwin, Precious Commodities: An Introduction, 55 DEPAUL L.
REV. 793, 793 (2006) (stating that roughly every hour a patient on the national organ
transplant waitlist dies before receiving a transplant).
135. Jefferies, supra note 72, at 626.
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these transplanted kidneys benefit these patients for fewer years
than if they were transplanted into healthier patients on the list
for less time.3 '
4. Living Kidney Donations. Cadaveric donors are not the
only source of transplant organs."7 Living donors also supply
organs for patients with ESRD, 35 because individuals can
function well with a single kidney.'39 In fact, the number of living
kidney donations for the first time surpassed the number of
cadaveric kidney donations in 2001.4°
136. See Posting of Richard A. Epstein, supra note 2 ("Seniority is not an attractive
criterion for organ allocation.").
137. Anderson, supra note 28, at 280.
138. Lobas, supra note 1, at 484 ("Living organ donations are possible for a single
kidney .... [However,] UNOS and the National Kidney Foundation standards governing
transplant procedures require doctors to ensure that the benefits of transplantation to the
recipient will outweigh the risks to the donor. In addition, doctors may not transplant an
organ if the recipient faces a 'clinically hopeless situation.").
139. See Anderson, supra note 28, at 280 & n.108 ("The somewhat limited
information availilable suggests that long-term renal function for people with only one
kidney remains good."); Sobota, supra note 12, at 1229 (asserting that living organ donors
primarily contribute kidneys, although more recently they have also begun to donate
livers). Living donors can function just fine after the removal of a kidney. Removal of
other organs, such as the heart, lungs, or pancreas would substantially injure or kill the
donor. Halperin, supra note 38, at 407.
140. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 41.
Kidney Donations: 1988-2004
Cadaveric Living Total
1988 3,876 1,812 5,688
1989 3,810 1,903 5,713
1990 4,306 2,094 6,400
1991 4,268 2,394 6,662
1992 4,276 2,535 6,811
1993 4,609 2,851 7,460
1994 4,797 3,009 7,806
1995 5,002 3,387 8,395
1996 5,036 3,670 8,706
1997 5,082 3,929 9,011.
1998 5,338 4,410 9,748
1999 5,386 4,692 10,078
Cadaveric Living Total
2000 5,489 5,447 10,936
2001 5,528 6,012 11,540
2002 5,636 6,236 11,872
2003 5,754 6,461 12,215
2004 6,326 6,648 12,974
Id.; see also Lobas, supra note 1, at 484 ("New technology and changing public attitudes
partially account for the rise in living organ donations, which now outnumber cadaver
donations.").
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Dr. Joseph Murray performed the first successful living
kidney transplant in 1954 by removing an identical twin's kidney
and transplanting it into the patient's twin brother.14' For years,
living kidney donors were made up solely of family members
directing kidneys usually to their parents, siblings, and
children.' To this day, living donations tend to be directed to
relatives, friends, and other acquaintances.
Before 1983, when scientists introduced cyclosporine to the
market, transplants from related donors significantly
outperformed those from nonrelated donors." However, as
immunosuppressives began to improve unrelated transplants,
doctors soon became willing to accept directed donations from
strangers discovering, for example, a recipient's need from a
news story, and eventually included nondirected donations as
well.
145
Living transplant kidneys have several advantages over
cadaveric kidneys. Patients live longer and organ grafts last
longer when the organ is transplanted from a living as opposed to
a cadaveric donor.'46 The success rate for transplants from living
donors significantly surpasses that for kidneys transplanted from
cadaveric donations, with 54.4% of living-donated transplants
still functioning a decade after transplantation as compared to
36.4% for the same regarding cadaveric-donated transplants.4 1 In
fact, not only do living donor transplants have a higher survival
rate than cadaveric grafts with a similar HLA mismatch, 
41
cadaveric grafts with superior HLA matching to transplants
between unrelated living donors still have inferior survival
141. Sobota, supra note 12, at 1225.
142. Anderson, supra note 28, at 280.
143. Over 98% of living organ donations are either directed to relatives or
acquaintances or are paired exchange donations, in which two donors direct one of their
kidneys to the relative or acquaintance of each other. Volokh, supra note 29, at 1834; see
also Arthur J. Matas et a]., Nondirected Donation of Kidneys from Living Donors, 343
NEW ENG. J. MED. 433, 435 (2000) ("[Bletween 1994 and 1998, there was a 38 percent
increase, from 3009 to 4156, in the number of transplants from living donors in the
United States. The acceptance of organs from emotionally related donors accounts for
much of the increase.").
144. Lobas, supra note 1, at 487. Even so, strangers make up only approximately 1%
of living kidney donors in the United States. Id.
145. Id. (noting that nondirected organ donations allow transplant hospitals to direct
the organs to renal patients according to their placement on the waitlist).
146. Matas et al., supra note 143, at 434-35; Matas et al., supra note 11, at 831.
147. Katherine M. Brown et al., Influence of Donor C3 Allotype on Late Renal-
Transplantation Outcome, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2014, 2015 (2006).
148. Paul I. Terasaki et al., High Survival Rates of Kidney Transplants from Spousal
and Living Unrelated Donors, 333 NEW ENG. J. MED. 333, 333 (1995).
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rates. 149 Richard Rohrer, the chief of transplant surgery at New
England Medical Center in Boston, noted that while "[a] person
who receives a living-donor kidney has a reasonable hope of a
lifetime of kidney function .... [a] person with a cadaveric
kidney has a reasonable hope of a decade of kidney function."5 °
Whereas the median lifetime of a cadaveric kidney is roughly
eleven years, kidneys transplanted from living donors generally
last more than twenty years.' Because an overwhelming
proportion of living kidneys continue to come from the recipient's
relatives,'52 unrelated living donors present the most valuable
potential for increasing the supply of donors in the future.'
Living donations offer the additional advantage of allowing
the kidney recipient sufficient time to make preparations for the
transplantation well in advanced of the procedure, reducing the
likelihood that complications will arise during the operation by
optimizing the recipient's medical condition for the surgery."'
This is largely because, for kidneys transplanted from living
donors, immunosuppressive therapy can be administered to the
kidney recipient well in advance of the operation. This increases
the effectiveness of the transplant,55 whereas these drugs can
only be administered at the time of the transplant in the case of a
cadaveric donor."' With living donors, both the organ donor and
recipient undergo their part of the procedure in the same hospital
so that, once the kidney is removed, the surgeon can immediately
149. Id. at 334; see also Jean-Paul Soulillou, Kidney Transplantation from Spousal
Donors, 333 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 379, 380 (1995) (noting that a ban on the purchase and
sale of organs severely limits use of unrelated living donors).
150. Finkel, supra note 3, at 28.
151. Id.
152. See Lobas, supra note 1, at 485 ("[Tloday most living organs still come from
related donors."); see also Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 230 ("There are ... two cases
reported in 1999 in which individuals made an undirected donation of a kidney."); Volokh,
supra note 29, at 1834 (stating that living organ donors who direct an organ anonymously
to strangers make up less than 1.5% of all organ donors).
153. Matas & Sutherland, supra note 10, at 1691.
154. See Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, About Donation > Living
Donation, http://www.optn.org/about/donation/livingDonation.asp (last visited Jan. 31,
2009) ("[Living donation] [t]ransplant surgery can be scheduled at a mutually-agreed
upon time rather than performed as an emergency operation.").
155. Levey et al., supra note 69, at 50; Matas et al., supra note 11, at 831 (stating
that preemptive kidney transplants, which are generally more successful than those
occurring after the patient has endured dialysis, are much more likely the result of living
rather than cadaveric kidney donors).
156. Levey et al., supra note 69, at 50.
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transplant it into the recipient.15 ' This, combined with the extra
preparation time, reduces transplantation complications. 8
Living donations-like cadaveric ones-are cost effective,
given that, overall, transplantations cost less than dialysis.
Moreover, the recipient's insurance company usually covers the
full amount of the donor's medical bills,'59 including the costs of
the donor's medical evaluation and her medical care during and
after the transplant procedure. 6 '
As the kidney shortage worsens, surgeons increasingly
transplant older, less viable cadaveric kidneys, 6' and are often
forced to perform surgery at a time that is suboptimal for a
patient's transplant success because matching cadaveric kidneys
often become available at a moment that was unforeseen and
remain transplantable for only a very limited period.6 2 Raising
the number of living kidney donations is the best way to meet the
demand of those who need kidney transplants.'63 Currently, fewer
than 7,000 Americans donate a living kidney each year.' Of
course, many more living Americans (and foreign donors) could
donate kidneys to those in need.'65
157. Sobota, supra note 12, at 1230.
158. Levey et al., supra note 69, at 50.
159. Lobas, supra note 1, at 490.
160. See Sobota, supra note 12, at 1228 (noting that many private insurance
companies provide coverage for the costs of organ transplants). But see Lobas, supra note
1, at 490-91 (stating that the "acquisition fee" charged to the recipient's insurance
company does not include costs associated with annual physicals the donor receives,
travel or lodging expenses, or lost wages, though the recipient of the organ may reimburse
the donor for these costs without violating the law prohibiting organ sales).
161. Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15. To help offset the current
kidney shortage, transplant doctors have increasingly accepted what previously have been
labeled "marginal" kidneys from "expanded criteria donors" that are geriatric,
hypertensive, and proteinuric. Friedman & Friedman, supra note 5, at 960.
162. Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, Response on Whether
Organs Should Be Purchased and Sold, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/
2006/01/response-on whe.html (Jan. 14, 2006, 19:04 EST) ("Surgeons and hospitals fight
sometimes over who has access to available organs, they see many patients die because
they cannot get organs, and they often must perform a transplant surgery at a time that
is not optimal for a person receiving the transplant because a matching organ becomes
available at a particular moment.").
163. See Matas et al., supra note 143, at 435 (asserting that in order to alleviate the
problem of lengthy waitlists for cadaveric kidneys, many transplantation centers began
using organs from living, "emotionally related" donors, such as a spouse or a close friend);
Matas et al., supra note 11, at 831 ("One potential solution to [the rising number of
patients on the waitlist for a kidney] is to increase the number of [living donor]
transplants.").
164. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1832 ("Each year, only about 6,500 living
Americans donate kidneys ... ").
165. See Finkel, supra note 3, at 30 ("In truth, there is actually a global surplus of
kidneys-sellers in India and Iraq literally line up at hospitals, often willing to part with
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The national kidney procurement system for living
donations currently comprises two independent systems: the
altruistic donor network and the private, loosely regulated (often
illegal) supply of commercial-living kidneys. 6'
III. THE 800-POUND GORILLA:
SELLING KIDNEYS
Like nearly every country,'67 the United States bans the sale
of human organs. 6 ' This ban has effectively imposed a zero-dollar
price ceiling.66 Even though such transactions were not officially
forbidden in all states until 1984, no evidence exists of domestic
organ sales taking place before then. " However, a free market
for organs in the United States almost became a reality in 1983
when H. Barry Jacobs, a man from Virginia, founded the
International Kidney Exchange Limited so he could broker
kidneys from living donors he planned to find in third-world
countries."' As a broker, Jacobs planned to pay healthy kidney
donors up to $10,000, a cost which the recipients would assume
in addition to a $2,000-5,000 brokerage fee.'72 But, shortly after
Jacobs announced his business plan, the State of Virginia banned
the sale of organs and the U.S. Congress soon followed suit.'73
The 1984 National Organ Transplant Act (NOTA) forbids
the exchange of transplantable organs for "valuable
consideration."'74 Congress firmly rejected the idea of an organ
a kidney for less than $1,000.. ").
166. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 169 (noting that underground kidney sale
systems flourish).
167. Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 86.
168. Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Jewish Medical Ethics: Monetary
Compensation for Donating Kidneys, 6 ISR. MED. ASS'N J. 185, 185 (2004) ("In 2000, the
Consensus Statement on the Live Organ Donor reported that 'direct financial
compensation for an organ from a living donor remains controversial and illegal in the
United States... .'" (internal citation omitted)). For a thorough examination of
prohibitive U.S. legislation, see Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets
for Human Organs, 14 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 57, 58-60 (1989).
169. Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 85.
170. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1107.
171. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 231. Jacobs planned to procure the kidneys
he would broker from indigents living in third world countries. Robinson, supra note 71,
at 1036.
172. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 231.
173. Id.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (a)-(b) (2000) ("It shall be unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate
commerce.... Any person who violates [this provision] shall be fined not more than
$50,000 or imprisoned not more then five years, or both."); Daar, supra note 9, at 600. In
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market by making it a felony to sell a human kidney, liver, heart,
lung, pancreas, bone marrow, cornea, eye, bone, or skin in
interstate commerce.' In enacting this prohibition, Congress
expressed its concern that permitting organ sales would
undermine the system of voluntary donations.' 6 Unfortunately,
in many ways this prohibition has actually jeopardized the
recruitment process of donated kidneys by virtually eliminating
more creative approaches to attracting donors.'
Prominent international bodies also view compensating
organ donors as "unacceptable."' In 1991, the World Health
Assembly adopted a set of discretionary Guiding Principles that
discourage the sale of human organs for transplantation.' 9
According to these principles, available on the World Health
Organization's (WHO) website, "The human body and its parts
addition, one year after the enactment of NOTA, the Ethics Committee of the
Transplantation Society released a concurring Policy Statement concluding that "[no
transplant surgeon/team shall be involved directly or indirectly in the buying or selling of
organs/tissues or in any transplant activity aimed at commercial gain to himself/herself or
an associated hospital or institute," shortly after which several other countries as well as
the World Health Organization (WHO) proposed similar bans. Friedman & Friedman,
supra note 5, at 960. NOTA, the only federal law to regulate the acquisition, allocation,
and transplantation of human organs, includes four main provisions: (1) Title I
established a Task Force on Organ Procurement and Transplantation to evaluate the
policies of organ procurement and transplantation; (2) Title II created the OPTN to help
pair donor organs with the most suitable hopeful organ recipients anywhere in the United
States; (3) Title II enables the Secretary of Health and Human Services to give grants to
organ procurement organizations; and (4) Title III makes it "unlawful for any person to
knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ for valuable
consideration." Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1108 (citing and quoting provisions found in 42
U.S.C. §§ 273, 274, 274e (2000)). Noticing that NOTA applies only to interstate commerce,
the 1986 Task Force encouraged states to adopt it so that the legislation would extend to
intrastate commerce as well. All fifty states responded by adopting in whole or in part the
1987 version of the UAGA, which included language identical to that in NOTA. While
every state is currently aligned in its ban of organ sales, the Task Force's report contains
an implicit assumption that if a single state were to repeal or modify its adoption of the
UAGA, that state could legally generate its own organ market so long as it did not
implicate interstate commerce. Id. at 1110.
175. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS--SPECIAL REPORT 75 (1987)
[hereinafter U.S. CONGRESS SPECIAL REPORT].
176. Id. at 76.
177. See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 223 (arguing that the prohibition has
"clos[ed] the door to innovative approaches such as estate tax relief, payment of expenses
associated with donation such as lost wages, travel expenses, coverage of other existing
medical bills, and funeral expenses").
178. "[Tlhe Council of Europe, the Transplantation Society, the World Health
Organization, and the World Health Assembly view commodification of body parts as
,unacceptable.'" Watkins, supra note 12, at 29-30.
179. World Health Organization, Human Organ and Tissue Transplantation,
http://www.who.intlethics/topics/human transplant/en (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
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cannot be the subject of commercial transactions."8 ° In 2000, the
World Medical Association stated that "[p]ayment for organs for
donation and transplantation must be prohibited" because "[a]
financial incentive compromises the voluntariness of the choice
and the altruistic basis for organ donation" and "is inconsistent
with the principles of justice."'' Accordingly, the Guiding
Principles state that "giving or receiving payment (including any
other compensation or reward) for organs should be
prohibited.' 8 2 The only type of payment for organs that donors
and recipients may exchange must not exceed "a justifiable fee
for the services rendered."' 3 Even advertising the need for or the
availability of an organ with the intent of offering or receiving
payment is prohibited.14 In addition, the Guiding Principles
suggest organs should be distributed according to medical need
without preference for the recipient's financial status or level of
insurance coverage.
However, as a result of the overwhelming number of chronic
renal patients lacking reasonable prospects of receiving a
cadaveric or donated-living transplant, some organizations,
including ones that have long opposed offering compensation to
organ donors, have recently begun to at least consider offering
some form of compensation.' The American Medical Association
(AMA), UNOS, the American Society of Transplant Surgeons
(ASTS), and OPSs have endorsed "limited studies" to evaluate
the potential of offering financial incentives to increase the
number of donors.'87 In June 2002, the AMA approved a pilot
program to determine whether monetary incentives for organs
would increase the supply of transplantable organs And, just
180. World Health Organization, Draft Guiding Principles on Human Organ
Transplantation, Guiding Principle 5, http://www.who.int/ethics/topics/
transplantation-guiding-principles/en/print.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
181. The World Medical Association, Statement on Human Organ Donation and
Transplantation, 30, http://www.wma.net/e/policy/wma.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
182. World Health Organization, supra note 180, at Guiding Principle 5.
183. Id. at Guiding Principle 8.
184. Id. at Guiding Principle 6.
185. Id. at Guiding Principle 9.
186. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1118. The Ad Hoc Committee for Solving the
Intractable Organ Shortage, a group formed by University of Pittsburgh scientist Harold
Kyriazi, has proposed "rewarded gifting" that would compensate family members for
allowing the organs of their deceased relatives to be harvested. Cohen, supra note 70, at
810.
187. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1118.
188. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 153; Daar, supra note 9, at 600. "In a call endorsed
by both the American Society of Transplant Surgeons and [UNOS], the AMA stated that
the 'time has come' and that '[tihere is enough evidence in favor of employing some form
of financial incentive to justify the implementation of a pilot program.'" Arthurs, supra
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recently, a group of renowned scientists, doctors, academics, and
clerics, among others, came together to form the Ad Hoc
Committee for Solving the Intractable Organ Shortage, the first
organization in the United States created with an agenda to
legalize the use of monetary payments to incentivize organ
donations."
The ASTS has generally objected to the buying, selling, or
brokering of organs, believing that organ donations from living
and cadaveric donors should be exclusively altruistic acts. 9°
ASTS approves of "the directed donation of deceased donor
organs to individual family members, friends, and individuals in
which there is a pre-established relationship" through
"communities (school, place of worship, place of employment or
other organizations)" or "via [Internet websites." 9' Where no
such relationship exists, ASTS supports the transplant of
donated organs in accordance with UNOS's waitlist policies and
procedures.192
Similarly, while UNOS encourages patients with kidney
disease to seek directed donations from living individuals they
know, it disfavors patients soliciting organs from strangers, out of
concern that such pleas could lead both to under-the-table sales as
well as to an inequitable distribution of organs.'93 Even when the
organ is donated by an outright gift, a number of transplant
surgeons have refused to perform the transplant when the donor
and recipient are strangers rather than friends or family
members.' These concerns and objections notwithstanding,
strangers have successfully engaged in Internet-facilitated
transplants. 9' In addition, MatchingDonors.com, a for-profit
website, enables "stranger" organ donors to pick a recipient
registered with the site based on the profile they provide.9
note 8, at 1118 (quoting AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, REPORT 4 OF THE COUNCIL ON
SCIENTIFIC AFFAIRS: INCREASING ORGAN DONATION, H-370.979 FINANCIAL INCENTIVES
FOR ORGAN PROCUREMENT (2002)).
189. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1118-19.
190. Statement on Directed Donation and Solicitation of Organs, AM. SOC'Y




193. Stimson, supra note 77, at 351, 355.
194. Posting of Richard A. Epstein, supra note 2.




The biggest concerns with donor-recipient Internet
solicitation are that it can hide the sale of kidneys'97 and that
Internet "matching" interferes with the fair allocation of
organs.'98  Some ethicists compare Internet exposure to
commercializing organs.'99 Arthur Caplan, a bioethicist at the
University of Pennsylvania, believes that just as a fair organ
system disallows donated-organ allocation to the highest bidder,
so too the system should prohibit these organs from going to
individuals attracting the most publicity. °° Indeed, this is
effectively a form of high-bid kidney purchase, because rich
would-be recipients will have a significant advantage in
expending sums to advertise their plights. And this undermines
the hierarchy of need as specified by relative placement on the
UNOS waitlist.2 °' Indeed, UNOS has stated that
MatchingDonor.com "subverts the equitable allocation of organs
for transplantation."2 2
ASTS does make an exception to its objection to stranger-
donated kidneys with its acceptance of "Live Paired Donation,"
programs, which facilitate organ donations to strangers when
two living donors are medically incompatible with their potential
recipients but match the other's desired recipient.203 ASTS
supports donations where "there are two willing living donors
who each turn out to be incompatible with their desired recipient
but compatible with the other donor's desired recipient."2 4
Supporters of this model assert that UNOS should encourage
paired exchanges by keeping a list not only of patients in need of
organ transplants but also of individuals willing to donate on
behalf of the hopeful recipients and their antigen compatibility
information.20 5
With altruism the only incentive, simply too few people
donate kidneys to meet the increasing demand of those needing a
197. See id. at 498-99.
198. Id. at 499.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. ("[Experts] say it is unfair to give an edge to people who are simply
better at recruiting donors over others who are sicker and ranked higher on the national
waiting list.").
202. Id. at 501 (citation omitted).
203. Statement on Paired Kidney Donation, AM. SOCY' TRANSPLANT SURGEONS
(Arlington, Va.), May 29, 2007, available at http://www.asts.orgfrools/Download.aspx?
fid=423.
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replacement."6 Americans are voicing their desire for a legal
alternative to the current system and stretching the limitations
currently imposed upon them.2 7
A. Selling Kidneys Is Not Allowed, but Some "Compensation" Is
While selling kidneys is prohibited, some states offer tax
deductions to families for donating the organs of their deceased
relatives or to donors themselves for living donations. °8 In 2004,
Wisconsin became the first state to begin offering living kidney
donors a tax deduction to cover expenses incurred from
donation.2 °9 Since then, Indiana, New York, and New Jersey have
adopted legislation allowing donors to receive tax deductions and
New Mexico and Pennsylvania are currently considering similar
legislative models.21 °
Likewise, living organ donors may also receive
reimbursement for medical bills and other related expenses
resulting from the transplant procedure.21' In 2000, Congress
206. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 10 ("[Ihf altruistic procurement is designed to
meet the overwhelming need for organs, it is a numerical failure."); Psst, Wanna Buy a
Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15 ("Unsurprisingly, with altruism the only incentive, not
enough people offer.").
207. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 153 ("As evidenced by Americans traveling
abroad to procure organs, and numerous studies, the desire for an appropriate legal
alternative organ procurement system, which addresses our tissue demand or shortage, is
apparent.").
208. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1114; Daar, supra note 9, at 600.
209. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1102. Wisconsin offers living kidney donors a $10,000
tax rebate. Sue Rabbitt Roff, Thinking the Unthinkable: Selling Kidneys, BRITISH MED. J.,
July 1, 2006, at 51, 51. Wisconsin's Assembly Bill 477 incentivizes kidney donations from
living, not cadaveric donors. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1125.
210. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1102.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(c)(2) (2000) ("The term 'valuable consideration' does not
include the reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation,
implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or
the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in
connection with the donation of the organ."); see also Daar, supra note 9, at 600 (noting
that "[riecipients can legally reimburse the living donors for medical bills and other
expenses"); Roff, supra note 209, at 51 ("In the ... United States living donors currently
have their expenses related to the operation and recovery reimbursed by the NHS,
Medicare, or insurance companies (or in the state of Wisconsin by tax rebates to the value
of $10,000)."); Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network, About Donation >
Living Donation, httpJ/www.optn.org/about/donation/livingDonation.asp (last visited Jan.
31, 2009) ("Health insurance coverage varies for living donation. If the recipient is covered
by a private insurance plan, most insurance companies pay 100 percent of the donor's
expenses. If the recipient is covered by Medicare's end-stage renal disease program,
Medicare Part A pays all of the donor's medical expenses, including preliminary testing,
the transplant operation, and post-operative recovery costs. Medicare Part B pays for
physician services during the hospital stay. Medicare covers follow-up care if
complications arise following the donation.").
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acted to encourage living organ donors by allowing compensation
for travel and living expenses incurred as a result of organ
donation."' In addition, federal as well as private employers often
furnish employees with several weeks of leave after undergoing
an organ donation.213 These reimbursement models, however,
more accurately resemble compensation for expenses than a
market based on the sale of a commodity.
1 4
B. Minor and Incompetent "Altruism"
Similarly, parents stretching the parameters of the
altruistic-donor model have sought to provide consent to the
donation of a child's kidney for a sibling or other close relative."5
Courts disagree over whether parents may authorize the removal
of a kidney from one of their minor or incompetent children for
the benefit of a sibling.2 6 In 1969, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
was the first jurisdiction in the United States to publish an
opinion addressing whether parents may substitute their
judgment for that of their child in the decision to remove the
child's kidney for implantation in a sibling.217 The court found it
to be in the best interest of a twenty-seven-year-old incompetent
child to donate a kidney to his older brother because "emotionally
and psychologically.., his well-being would be jeopardized more
severely by the loss of his brother than by the removal of a
kidney."
1 8
Following the court's decision, in 1972 the Connecticut
Superior Court expanded Kentucky's Strunk ruling to include
child donors who are minors.219 In Hart v. Brown, the parents of
212. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 222-23.
213. Roff, supra note 209, at 51.
214. See Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 223 ("Though far from a general reversal
of a prohibition on the sale of organs, HR 2418 does signal a willingness to acknowledge
the role that limited financial compensation can play in organ donations."); see also Roff,
supra note 209, at 51 ('The service model is well established in the payment of research
subjects for their time and loss of earnings... and the risk factor and unpleasantness of
the procedures they are subjecting themselves to.").
215. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 71.
216. Id. Australian law prohibits transplantation of nonregenerative material from a
living minor child. Although the Australian Law Reform Commission proposed allowing
such transplantation on condition, for example, that the procedure benefits a member of
the child's immediate family and that the procedure is approved by a committee that
includes a judge and two other people, the states' legislatures rejected the
recommendation. Daniel Sinclair, Kidney Donations from the Legally Incompetent in
Jewish and Comparative Law, 27 ISR. L. REV. 588, 597-98 (1993).
217. Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969).
218. Id. at 146.
219. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 390-91 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972).
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seven-year-old twins sought a declaratory judgment from the
court authorizing the removal of a kidney from one daughter for
implantation in the other.22° The court determined that it would
be of "immense benefit" for the child to take part in the donation
to her sister and that the child's happiness was largely
determined by the happiness of her family, so that her parents
should be permitted to substitute their legal judgment for their
child regarding the donation.221' The biggest concern with such
"altruistic" donations, in addition to their insignificant ability to
address the shortage of kidneys, is that they may lack legitimate
informed consent.
C. The Sale of Kidneys in International Markets
Growing demand and increasingly long wait periods for
transplantable kidneys are driving "transplant tourism."222 Only
very few countries legalize the sale of organs.22 However,
patients who feel unable to remain on cadaveric-kidney waitlists
in their own countries and who possess resources to shop for
organs overseas often undertake transplant surgery in third-
world or developing countries from either cadaveric donors (in
presumed-consent states) or, more often, from living donors.2 24
220. Id. at 386-87.
221. Id. at 389, 391.
222. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 10-11 (noting that the altruistic organ donor
model is concealing the surge in black market shopping, commonly referred to as
"transplant tourism" or "organ tourism"); Abraham McLaughlin, Ilene R. Prusher &
Andrew Downie, What is a Kidney Worth?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 9, 2004,
available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0609/pOlsO3-wogi.html (chronicling the
experiences of three men in the "transplant tourism" market: an unemployed Brazilian,
an ailing Israeli, and a South African investigator who helped bust an organ trafficking
ring).
223. See Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 86 ("It is illegal in nearly all developed nations
to sell or buy a human organ-only in Iran and Pakistan is there a legal market."); Finkel,
supra note 3, at 28 (stating that the sale of human organs is legal in Iran); Declan Walsh,
Transplant Tourists Flock to Pakistan, Where Poverty and Lack of Regulation Fuel Trade
in Human Organs, GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
pakistan/Story/0,2763,1409415,00.html (discussing the thriving industry of organ sales in
India).
224. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 184, 189 (asserting that "[o]rgan suppliers hail from
primarily Pakistan, India, South Africa, Peru, Romania, Bolivia, and Brazil" and that,
before the war, the going rate in Iraq for a transplant kidney was approximately $750,
while a kidney sold during the same period by a U.S. donor could sell for $30,000); Alfred
Cohen, Sale or Donation of Human Organs, 52 J. HALACHA 37, 38 (2006) (asserting that
patients with resources to purchase organs from the black market usually receive an
organ more quickly than patients on the national waitlist); Johnson, supra note 3 (stating
that in Eastern Europe, donors are typically young males from rural areas, aged eighteen
to twenty-eight, who because of economic hardships part with one of their kidneys for as
little as $2,500-3,000); see also Friedman & Friedman, supra note 5, at 961 (stating that
Organs Watch, a privately owned transplant monitoring organization, estimates that
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Officials from the Philippines are actively seeking to lure in
international demand for transplant organs.225  fWhat's
happening now is absurd. Airplanes are leaving every week. I've
seen 300 of my patients go abroad and come back with new
kidneys ... it's a free-for-all," remarked the late Michael
Friedlaender, a transplant nephrologist at Hadassah University
Hospital in Israel.226
Because patients who purchase kidneys in the international
market typically receive kidneys from living donors, their
kidneys typically function longer than those who await the legal
transplant of cadaveric kidneys from the UNOS waitlist in the
United States.227
Given the overwhelming number of lives at stake, many
patients, doctors, and organ brokers remain undeterred by the
criminalization of the exchange of cash for kidneys.2 ' Despite
"thousands of illegal transplants occur every year bought by patients from the Persian
Gulf states, Japan, Italy, Israel, the US and Canada supplied by donor nations, including
India, Pakistan, Turkey, Peru, Mexico, Romania, and South Africa" (internal quotations
omitted)); Telephone Interview with Jim Cohan, supra note 91 (stating that patients may
choose whether they want a cadaveric or living donation, and the coordinator will
accommodate the recipients' desires).
225. Angela F. Domingo & Edsel Maurice T. Salvana, Letter to the Editor,
Solicitation of Deceased and Living Organ Donors, 356 NEw ENG. J. MED. 2427, 2427-28
(2007) (asserting that an undersecretary of health in the Philippines proposed increasing
the price of kidneys there from $3,000-4,000 each and increasing the number of
transplants hospitals are allowed to make available to international patients from 10% of
the country's transplants to 20%).
226. Friedman & Friedman, supra note 5, at 961.
227. See Finkel, supra note 3, at 28 (noting that living sellers are usually demanded
and only occasionally are cadaver kidneys sold on the black market). Dr. Friedlaender, a
nephrologist at Hadassah University in Jerusalem, found that when he compared black
market kidney transplants with those performed legally, the percentage of illegal
transplants still functioning after one year was slightly higher than the percentage of
those performed in his own hospital and even in many U.S. hospitals. The reason for this
difference, he says, is the benefit of transplanting kidneys from living donors.
"After I realized that," Friedlaender says, "I softened my stance.
Examining ... 300 [of my] patients [who went abroad and came back
with new kidneys] brought me down from my high horse of ethics.
Now I'm more practical. My patients don't want my opinion on
whether or not buying a kidney is moral-they want to know if it's
safe. And I have to say that it is. It's as safe as having a transplant at
a U.S. hospital. I realized that I had no right to actively stop my
patients from going. I realized that it may be harming them not to go.
So when they ask, I tell them, 'Yes, you should go.'"
Id. at 31.
228. Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 87. Jim Cohan, a U.S. organ transplant
coordinator, was arrested in Italy for his efforts. After waiting six months in an Italian
prison while his attorneys pursued legal proceedings to secure his freedom, Mr. Cohan
was released. He discontinued his organ transplant coordination business for two years,
and upon resumption, no longer travels overseas in facilitating organ transplants.
Telephone Interview with Jim Cohan, supra note 91.
20091 KIDNEYS, CASH, & KASHRUT 1561
attempts by the United Nations to curb the international and
black market for organ procurement,"' and even though many
patients turn to this option only as a last ditch effort to save their
lives,23 ° the international market for organs is growing at a rapid
pace23' due to the high demand232 of this highly price-inelastic
medical commodity. As a result, donors selling organs into the
black market receive less now for a kidney than they once did,2 3
sometimes less than promised.234 Donors in India now accept less
than $2,000 for a kidney, "a bargain for a rich American or
European, but a sizeable sum considered from the perspective of
a slum dweller living in poverty."3 ' Of course, this does not mean
that the recipient is also paying less to receive the kidney. In
fact, just the opposite is occurring because middlemen often
exploit the unregulated nature of the system.236 Organ recipients
229. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 185 (explaining that in an effort to curb the organ
black market, the WHO issued nonbinding antitrafficking protocols in 1991 that were
adopted by 192 countries, including the United States).
230. One woman from Brooklyn, N.Y., who as a last resort located a kidney through
an international organ broker, explained, "I had been on dialysis for 15 years and on two
transplant lists for 7." She was initially concerned that securing a kidney from the
international market might be illegal, but "[nlothing was happening, and my health was
getting worse and worse." The years of dialysis had weakened her heart and lungs, and
she had personally known four other women who died while waiting for a kidney
transplant. Finally, the woman said, "my doctors told me to get a kidney any way I could,"
or prepare to die. Rohter, supra note 9; see also GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 186 (asserting
that the slim odds of receiving a kidney transplant in the United States motivates
candidates to participate in the black market for transplant kidneys).
231. See Daar, supra note 9, at 600 (noting that the organ black market is growing
rapidly throughout the developing world; specifically, transplant centers have been
"documented in the Philippines, Iraq, China, India, South Africa, Turkey, Eastern
Europe, and elsewhere"); Johnson, supra note 3 (declaring that the organ black market is
growing rapidly throughout Eastern Europe and explaining that increasingly longer wait
periods for legal transplantable kidneys are causing patients in large numbers to seek out
kidneys from the international markets).
232. Daar, supra note 9, at 600 ("The situation is very easy to understand: an
unquenchable demand meets a supply that can save lives."); Goodwin, supra note 134, at
793 (declaring that "[tihe current demand for [human transplant organs] is far greater
than it has been at any other time in human history").
233. Brazilian donors trafficking their kidneys into South Africa receive less now
than they did before. Whereas organ brokers initially paid them as much as $10,000-
more than a decade's wages-to traffic one of their kidneys into South Africa, Alberty Jos6
da Silva, a Brazilian who traveled to South Africa in approximately 2004 to donate his
kidney, was paid a mere $6,000. By November 2004, so many residents in the Recife
slums of Brazil began donating one of their kidneys to middlemen that the going rate
plummeted to just $3,000. Rohter, supra note 9.
234. Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 90 ("[A] landmark 2002 study of illegal kidney
sales in India revealed ... that [donors] were paid on average one-third less than that
which they were promised.").
235. Watkins, supra note 12, at 34-35 (quoting STEPHEN WILKINSON, BODIES FOR
SALE: ETHICS AND EXPLOITATION IN THE HUMAN BODY TRADE 105 (2003)).
236. See Daar, supra note 9, at 600 (explaining that donors and recipients will suffer
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often pay outrageously more for transplant organs than donors
receive... because traffickers and doctors pocket most of the
fees.238 High fees result partly from the high risk involved in
bringing together the often illegal transaction. 2 1 jim Cohan,an
organ transplant coordinator in California who schedules organ
transplantations, charges $90,000 to arrange a kidney
transplant, which includes airfare and local travel costs, a
companion ticket, the surgery, and the kidney.2 0 Because such
transplants are not typically covered by insurance, black market
organs are generally transplanted only in patients able to afford
the prices, regardless of need.2 1
The Internet and certain clinics that purchase organs
directly from the donor are, however, helping to reduce costs to
the recipients in these international transactions by eliminating
the middleman.242 Internet websites and chat rooms now make it
if legislation does not check the problem).
237. See Daar, supra note 9, at 600 (asserting that the Overseas Medical Services in
Calgary, Canada charge roughly $32,000 to organize an organ transplant from a living
donor in Pakistan); Finkel, supra note 3, at 30 (reporting that kidney donors in India and
Iraq are often willing to accept less than $1,000 to part with one of their kidneys.);
McLaughlin et al., supra note 222 (showing that a Brazilian donor received $6,000 of the
$45,000 the Israeli recipient paid for a kidney transplanted in South Africa); Rohter,
supra note 9 (stating that Alberty Jos6 da Silva was paid merely one-tenth of the amount
the recipient was charged); Johnson, supra note 3 (noting that in Eastern Europe,
recipients of kidney transplants pay ten times more than the mere $2,500-3,000 donors
receive).
238. Johnson, supra note 3 (revealing doctors and traffickers as the key
beneficiaries). According to Jim Cohan, living kidney donors who sell one of their kidneys
over the black market receive only a very small portion of the recipient's total fee. They
receive anywhere from $800 to at most $10,000 for a donation. Even the broker of the
transaction takes a modest cut, somewhere around 10%. The majority of the donor's fee,
insists Cohan, goes to the transplant surgeons. Finkel, supra note 3, at 30.
239. Transplant surgeons demand such high fees for performing illegal transplant
procedures because with each performance they risk their career. Even transplant
brokers expose themselves to risk of being arrested, although almost no one worldwide
has ever been convicted of organ trafficking. For this reason, California broker Jim Cohan
no longer accompanies his kidney sellers for their kidney removal. "I do everything on the
phone and on the Internet," he says. "I talk with doctors. I tell doctors about me, and
doctors tell their kidney patients. I don't buy organs; I don't sell organs-I'm really just
the producer. I produce operations. I just bring all the parties together. And I've never
had any of my clients die." Id.
240. Telephone Interview with Jim Cohan, supra note 91.
241. Robert Berman, Selling Organs Should Be Legal, THE JERUSALEM POST, Aug.
10, 2005, at 15 ("[Tjhe existing black market is ensuring that [the organs] go only to those
who can afford the inflated prices.").
242. See Kevin O'Flynn, Wanted, THE Moscow TIMEs, Dec. 8, 2006 ("One seller [in
Russia] called Extreem, who looks like he just walked off the stage of Krasnaya
Shapochka, created his own web site where he shows off his buff chest to possible clients
and to the surgeon who will do the cutting. He is offering his kidney for $20,000, one of
the lower prices of those on sale.... There are buyers advertising too, and there are
kidney pimps on the English web sites. Others simply want to buy a kidney for their
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possible for organ donors and recipients to independently
negotiate their own arrangements for transplantation.243
Black markets are legally, economically, and socially
undesirable.'" Organ transplantation lacks international
uniformity,"" and countries supplying kidney surpluses
invariably adhere to the loosest standards for organ trade.246
Insurance does not fund these transplants,247 and black markets
often produce organized crime.24 Kidney sellers risk submitting
to the procedure in unhygienic facilities and typically receive
minimal or no medical treatment after selling the organ.249 As a
result, many are forced to return to poor living conditions and
hard manual labor with deteriorating health.25 ° Many once
relatives. Andrei from Kiev wants one for his daughter, while someone from Izhevsk is
offering $20,000 to buy a kidney for his sister."); see also Goyal et al., supra note 3, at
1590 (noting that in response to the concerns that middle men keep a large portion of the
payment and often misrepresent to patients what a nephrectomy will involve, some
transplantation clinics purchase organs directly from donors).
243. See Lobas, supra note 1, at 498 (noting that as of November 2004, there were
three documented cases of Internet-facilitated organ transplants).
244. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 172 (explaining that because black markets are
unregulated and difficult to police, they tend to result in the abuse of vulnerable
populations and promote unethical conduct).
245. Many nations have no legal standards at all for the organ trade; in countries
where legislation does exist, standards are substantially inconsistent, for example,
concerning the regulation of living and cadaveric organ donation, organ trade and
penalization, and brain death. Watkins, supra note 12, at 16.
246. Jefferies, supra note 72, at 625.
247. See Daar, supra note 9, at 600 (asserting that in the developing world living
donation is the only option and "often has to be paid for by the recipient"); McLaughlin et
al., supra note 222 (noting an exception whereby Israeli health insurance reimburses
patients for medical procedures that are performed outside the country).
248. See Daar, supra note 9 (explaining how after a black market is created
"[mliddlemen exploit the situation and organized crime moves in").
249. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 185-86 (asserting that organ donors of the black
market risk undergoing the procedure in a hospital that is not clean and rarely receive
medical follow-up); Rohter, supra note 9 (noting that while recipients of trafficked kidneys
in South Africa remain under intense medical supervision and receive detailed records of
the transplant procedure, donors, on the other hand, are monitored "for a maximum of
three days," according to one South African investigator); Johnson, supra note 3
(explaining that the removal surgeries often take place at night at rented facilities).
250. See Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 94 (citing a recent study showing that the
majority of black market kidney sellers in India had deteriorating health); David J.
Rothman, Ethical and Social Consequences of Selling a Kidney, 288 J. AM. MED. ASS'N
1640, 1641 (2002) (reporting that 87% of kidney donors report a deterioration in their
health following the procedure); Johnson, supra note 3 ("Donors have no medical follow-
up, and their health often deteriorates as they return to a lifestyle involving poor living
conditions and hard physical labour."). Jos6 Carlos da Conceicao da Silva, a Brazilian
manual laborer who hauls produce, said, "For me, the complications began almost
immediately." He also said that three days after his kidney was removed, he required an
additional surgery on one of his lungs. Since returning to Brazil, he says, his general
health has worsened. He said, "I'm tired all the time and can't lift heavy weights, which I
have to be able to do if people are going to hire me.... My blood pressure goes up and
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desperate to sell one of their kidneys in black markets now regret
making the decision.25'
Many countries, such as Israel, India, South Africa, Turkey,
China, Russia, Iraq, Argentina, and Brazil, do not stringently
enforce their legislation banning the sale of organs."' For
instance, Japanese often buy organs in the Philippines; Israelis
have often purchased organs in Turkey or former Soviet Union
states; people of the Arabian Gulf countries buy organs in India;
and people of Malaysia often acquire organs in China.253 India
has banned kidney sales since 1994, but patients continue to
locate donors willing to accept payment in exchange for donating
a kidney.254 Donors avoid legal consequences by simply signing an
affidavit swearing they have not received any payment.255
Mumbai alone generated approximately $10 million dollars in
2001 from kidney sales.256 In fact, even though Israel has limited
the source of domestic organ procurement to altruistic
donations,5  Israeli health insurance currently reimburses
patients for some, if not all, of the costs associated with brokered
kidney transplants performed outside of Israel's borders.25 Israel
down, and I feel pain and numbness where the scar from the operation is." Rohter, supra
note 9.
251. See Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 95-96 (noting that of the sellers in India's
black market kidney trade, four out of five would not recommend selling kidneys to
others).
252. See Rothman, supra note 250, at 1641 (explaining that by allowing patients to
purchase organs abroad, countries avoid addressing cultural objections to paid
donations-citing Japanese patients going to the Philippines, Israeli patients going to
Turkey and former Soviet Union countries, patients in the Gulf States going to India, and
Malaysian patients going to China as examples); Finkel, supra note 3, at 28 (noting that
China, India, Iraq, Israel, Russia, and Turkey turn a blind eye to the involvement of their
citizens in the sale of organs); Rohter, supra note 9 (noting that there is no law against
trafficking human organs in Israel and that some international organ brokers openly
solicit organ recipients in Israeli newspapers and radio stations).
253. Rothman, supra note 250, at 1641. Despite having illegalized organ sales in
1995, India is infamous for selling organs on the black market; there is also extensive
organ trafficking from Moldava in Eastern Europe to Israel through Turkey. Watkins,
supra note 12, at 34-35.
254. Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 88.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. The number of altruistic donations in Israel is remarkably low despite a waitlist
for kidneys that grows at a rate of 20% each year. In fact, according to one commentator,
"organ donation rates in Israel are among the lowest in the developed world" partly due to
the belief by some Israelis that the Jewish law forbidding desecration of the human body
outlaws organ donation. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 187-88 (quoting Rohter, supra note 9
(noting that despite concern by some that Jewish law may forbid organ donation, Israeli
citizens strongly oppose a bill drafted by the Health Ministry that would make trafficking
organs illegal)).
258. Finkel, supra note 3, at 28. Even though Israeli health insurance companies are
not technically permitted to reimburse patients for illegal surgeries, they currently
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essentially relieves the country's demand for transplant kidneys
by funding the export of its transplant patients.259 One health
ministry ordinance currently permits "Israelis who go abroad for
transplants to be reimbursed as much as $80,000.,,160 Patients
traveling abroad to buy trafficked organs "save the country a lot
of money," said a kidney specialist in Israel, "not only in terms of
what doesn't have to be spent on dialysis, but also by opening
places for other people who are on the list."26' According to one
transplant coordinator at an Israeli hospital, nearly twenty-five
percent of the hospital's patients receiving post-transplant
kidney care purchased their new kidney from a stranger.262
Unfortunately, however, Israel's policy does not regulate the
source of the kidney transplants or the manner in which the
kidneys are procured."2
Black market organ trade occurs not only in foreign
countries but in America as well. Held unaccountable to a
national transplant screening board, each U.S. hospital has the
discretion to establish its own living donor requirements.264 Some
hospitals even implement a "don't ask, don't tell" policy with
261
respect to a donor's relationship to foreign recipients. Organ
brokers know which hospitals overlook whether a donor-
recipient relationship exists, so foreign patients often arrive at
the hospital with a willing but unrelated donor who will at some
point receive cash.266 In 2001, dozens of Moldavians allegedly
entered the United States to sell their kidneys.267
reimburse patients up to $70,000 for medical procedures performed outside of Israel.
Israeli government and health officials respond that there is little they can do to control
what a patient does outside of the country's territory. McLaughlin et al., supra note 222.
Likewise, despite banning organ sales domestically, many Middle Eastern countries give
their blessing to citizens traveling to Pakistan to arrange an organ transplant. For
instance, Saudi Arabia has prohibited the sale of organs within the country, but the
Islamabad embassy assists citizens with transplant arrangements who wish to receive
one in Pakistan. Declan Walsh, Transplant Tourists Flock to Pakistan, Where Poverty and
Lack of Regulation Fuel Trade in Human Organs, GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2005,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2005/feblO/pakistan.declanwalsh.
259. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 188.
260. Rohter, supra note 9.
261. Id.; see also Finkel, supra note 3, at 28 (stating that Israeli insurance companies
are willing to reimburse renal patients for kidney transplants because the transplant is
less expensive than dialysis).
262. Finkel, supra note 3, at 28.
263. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 188.
264. Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 88.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 89.
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D. Religious Position on Kidney Sales
Religious authorities diverge about whether individuals are
permitted to donate their organs. Some outright oppose organ
transplants68  while others remain careful to voice their
approval.269 The majority of major world religions, however, hold
a neutral tone towards the individual's decision to donate,27 °
despite sometimes imposing a few stipulations.2 ' When it comes
to permitting individuals to sell their organs, however, the
perspectives of religious authorities align more closely. For the
most part, even those who do not oppose organ donations
disapprove of the sale of organs. For instance, the U.S.
Conference of Catholic Bishops held that "[t]he transplantation of
organs from living donors is morally permissible... [but] the
freedom of the prospective donor must be respected, and
268. American Red Cross, Tissue Donation: Statements from Various Religions,
http://www.redcross.org/donate/tissue/relgstmt.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2008) (also on
file with the Houston Law Review) (reporting that most Roma oppose tissue and organ
donations because they believe that for one year after death, a person's soul retraces its
steps; in order for this to occur, they think that all of the body's parts must remain intact
as they believe the soul takes on a physical shape). The Shinto disapprove of organ
donation because it damages the donor's body. Watkins, supra note 12, at 10.
269. American Red Cross, supra note 268. Presbyterians, in particular, encourage
organ donations. The Episcopal Church passed a resolution in 1982 observing the life-
saving advantages of donating blood, tissue, and organs and encouraged all Christians to
donate them "as part of their ministry to others in the name of Christ, who gave His life
that we may have life in its fullness." Roman Catholics recognize organ donation as an act
of charity, fraternal love, and self sacrifice, and "encourage donation as an act of
charity[,]" explains Father Leroy Wickowski, Director of the Office of Health Affairs of the
Archdiocese of Chicago, who also noted that organ donation "is something good that can
result from tragedy and a way for families to find comfort by helping others" and
cautioned "that the organs are removed only after death and that people's wishes are
respected." Id.
270. For example, organ and tissue transplants are not inconsistent with the
teachings of the Church of Christ (Disciples of Christ), Church of Christ (Independent),
Hinduism, or Independent Conservative Evangelicals. The Greek Orthodox Church does
not disapprove of organ donations when the organs are used to improve the quality of
human life, for example, when they are transplanted or are used for research that will
lead to improvements in preventing or treating diseases. Seventh-Day Adventists believe
individuals have a right to donate or receive an organ when doing so will help restore one
of the senses or will prolong the quality of life. On the other hand, Buddhists believe that
donating an organ is a matter of individual choice because there is nothing written in
Buddhist teachings prohibiting it. While Jehovah's Witnesses do not encourage donating
organs, they believe the decision is for the individual to make. Christian Scientists and
Mormons also believe that the decision whether or not to donate an organ is a matter of
individual choice. Id.
271. The Amish consent to organ transplants only when it is certain that the
recipient will benefit from the procedure. Similarly, Baptists generally approve when the
procedure offers medical hope for the recipient without seriously endangering the donor.
The Muslim Religious Council has stipulated that organ transplants are acceptable
provided donor's written consent is secured in advance and so long as the organ is
transplanted immediately and not stored in an organ bank. Id.
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economic advantages should not accrue to the donor."272 Of the
same mind, Catholic theologians Benedict Ashley and Kevin
O'Rourke explain that "if society is to live in a humane manner,
generosity and charity, rather than monetary gain and greed,
must serve as the basis for donation of functioning organs."273
Similarly, Bishop Dimitrios of Xanthos expressed, "The
Greek Orthodox Church accepts the possibility of any kind of
transplant, if it is not a commercial transaction. Only
philanthropy constitutes a proper motive for giving and receiving
organs. Otherwise it commodifies human organs and thus
deprives the action of ethical quality."2 4 Likewise, the Board of
Social Responsibility at the Church of Scotland "totally endorses
the moral judgment of the British Parliament in passing a Bill
which makes it a criminal offence to buy, sell, or advertise
human organs."'7 The Board concluded that "[ilf the tissue or
organ to be donated is the gift of G[-]d and if the imperative of
the Gospel is to love our neighbor unconditionally, then donation
must be made freely on the grounds of need, not conditionally on
the grounds of creed, or lucratively on the grounds of greed."2 6
And, Bishop Tom Breidenthal compared organs sales to
prostitution, explaining that for Episcopalians, while "sell[ing] a
kidney to a needy recipient is better than selling one's body as a
sexual object, because the purpose of the sale is better ... the
selling remains morally wrong-indeed, it may even be more
wrong, since the need of the sick person is an example of what
G[-]d (who alone 'owns' our bodies) intends us to use our bodies
for, namely, to glorify G[-]d and serve our neighbor." '
In 1996, a committee of scholars from all the major Muslim
Schools of Law in Great Britain determined that "[h]uman
organs should be donated and not sold. It is prohibited to receive
a price for an organ.""27 In fact, the prominent Muslim lecturer
Muhammad Al-Munajjid stated there that the Islamic Fiqh
Council had issued a fatwa (religious ruling) holding that "[ilt is
not permitted to trade in human organs under any
circumstances. But the question of whether the beneficiary may









spend money to obtain an organ he needs, or to show his
appreciation, is a matter which is still under scholarly debate."279
The Jewish perspective on selling organs directly contrasts
trends developing in other major world religions.28 ° Unlike
secular medical ethics, which seek to turn ethical principles into
law, Jewish medical ethics operate in the reverse by distilling
ethical principles from already-existing law.281  Documents
compiling the Jewish perspective on health practices date as far
back as 3,000 years.282 Instead of categorically either forbidding
or allowing new medical technologies,282 Jewish authorities
carefully evaluate the consequences of new medical
advancements on a case-by-case basis.284 However, because the
posekim (rulings) of previous generations could not have
addressed every possible medical advancement and because
contemporary rabbinic authorities and courts lack hierarchical
structure, clear halakhic (Jewish law) precedent pertaining to
medical issues rarely exists.285 Thus, the modern rulings must
both locate relevant source material and apply the material to
modern medical issues.286
From the Jewish perspective, organ transplantation
presents complex issues involving analysis of many halakhic
duties.287 To determine whether Orthodox Jewish law permits the
279. Id.
280. See Michael J. Broyde, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, Stem Cells and
Jewish Law, TRADITION, Spring 2004, at 54, 58-59 (explaining how the Jewish approach
is in "direct tension" with two trends: "to seek to limit the ability of science to change
fundamentals of nature" and "to defer to individual choices and abhor governmental
regulation").
281. See Lord Immanuel Jakobovits, The Role of Jewish Medical Ethics in Shaping
Legislation, in MEDICINE AND JEWISH LAW 1, 2-3, 13-14 (Fred Rosner ed., 1990)
(referencing occasions in which Jewish religious views were invited to aid in formulating
official policies on new legislation); Susan L. Mayer, Thoughts on the Jewish Perspective
Regarding Organ Transplantation, 7 J. TRANSPLANT COORDINATION 67, 67 (1997) (stating
that according to Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits, the term "Jewish medical ethics" came
about in the 1950s as a response to the increasing number of organ transplantations).
282. See Mayer, supra note 281, at 68 ("Jewish medical ethics represents the wisdom
and intellectual labor of millennia, stretching from the Old Testament and Talmud
through the codes of Jewish law to the most recent rabbinic essays and Responsa.").
283. See, e.g., Broyde, supra note 280, at 56 ("Jewish law insists that new
technologies... are neither categorically prohibited nor categorically permissible.").
284. Id.
285. Edward Reichman, Uterine Transplantation and the Case of the Mistaken
Question, TRADITION, Summer 2003, at 20, 20. There is no central authority to promulgate
Jewish rulings because contemporary rabbinic authorities and courts lack hierarchical
structure. Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Nonaltruistic Kidney Donations in
Contemporary Jewish Law and Ethics, 75 TRANSPLANTATION 250, 251 (2003).
286. Reichman, supra note 285, at 20.
287. Mayer, supra note 281, at 67.
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buying and selling of organs, two distinct questions must be
answered: first, whether Jewish law authorizes the transfer of
human organs from one individual to another, and second,
whether Jewish law authorizes the kidney donor to be paid for
the removed kidney."'
1. Donating Kidneys Under Jewish Law. Under American
law, there generally is no requirement to save the life of someone
unless one has assumed a duty of care to the individual in need.
This concept has been demonstrated in the context of tissue
donation. For example, in 1978, David Shimp of Pennsylvania
agreed to donate bone marrow for a transplant of his terminally
ill cousin, Robert McFall, but then reneged on the agreement.2"9
When McCall filed suit to compel his cousin to go through with
the donation, the court ruled that "[tihe common law has
consistently held to a rule which provides that one human being
is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save
another human being or to rescue."2 ° In fact, Minnesota and
Vermont are the only states that have enacted Good Samaritan
statutes imposing a penalty for failure to intervene with life-
saving assistance when in a position to help someone in need, but
even those statutes do not require invasion of the person's body
without his or her consent.29'
In Western culture, such acts of helping others are
commonly classified as charity. Jewish law, on the other hand,
requires one to help a person who is in need.292 Whereas charity
288. Goodwin, supra note 134, at 796 (citing Steven H. Resnicoff, Supplying Human
Body Parts: A Jewish Law Perspective, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 853 (2006)).
289. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 63-65 (describing McFall and Shimp as not only
cousins but good friends and revealing that after a long search it was determined that
Shimp was the only suitable donor).
290. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 91 (Pa. Com. P1. 1978).
291. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01 (West 2000) ("A person at the scene of an
emergency who knows that another person is exposed to or has suffered grave
physical harm shall, to the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril
to self or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person. Reasonable
assistance may include obtaining or attempting to obtain aid from law enforcement
or medical personnel."); VT. STAT. ANN. tit 12, § 519 (1973) ("A person who knows that
another is exposed to grave physical harm shall, to the extent that the same can be
rendered without danger or peril to himself or without interference with important duties
owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or
care is being provided by others.").
292. See Exodus 23:4 ("[Y]ou must take it back to him...."); Leviticus 19:18 ("Love
your neighbor as yourself[.I"); Elliott N. Dorff, Choosing Life: Aspects of Judaism Affecting
Organ Transplantation, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES 168,
181-82 (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 1996) (i[Flor Judaism, helping others is part of
one's duty to G[-]d and to one's fellow human beings."); Aaron L. Mackler, Respecting
Bodies and Saving Lives: Jewish Perspectives on Organ Donation and Transplantation, 10
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suggests acts that are performed beyond one's call of duty,
zedakah, monetary assistance, and hesed, the Jewish term used
to describe any other type of assistance, are obligations both to
G-d and to other individuals. 93 These obligations are most
essential when a human life might be saved (pikuah nefesh)."4 In
the Jewish tradition, humans have a role on Earth to "improve
the world in the image of the Divine"295 and to safeguard against
destruction and illness.9 ' Given that the body is G-d's property,
297
saving human life is one of the most fundamental mitzvahs
(Jewish commandments) of halacha . Indeed, it is the most
CAMBRIDGE Q. OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS 420, 421 (2001) (explaining that Judaism teaches
that "G[-Id has entrusted humans with the power and responsibility to feed the hungry,
comfort the afflicted, and heal the sick"). According to Deuteronomy 22:2, humans should
restore what has been lost, which has been interpreted to include lost health and function.
Deuteronomy 22:2.
293. The Jewish concepts zedakah and hesed are distinct from charity. Charity is a
Latin word that means "affection" or "love," and it signifies actions motivated by affection
that exceed one's obligations. Therefore, those who are charitable are characterized as
virtuous individuals. Zedakah, on the other hand, the Hebrew word used to describe
financial assistance that is given to others who are in need, derives from the root meaning
"justice." In Judaism, helping other people is an obligation one has to G-d and other
individuals rather than an act that is beyond one's call of duty. Nevertheless, one can still
feel good about performing zedakah, but unlike charitable individuals who may delight in
exceeding society's expectations of them, the enjoyment stems from fulfilling one's duty.
This does not mean that zedakah cannot also be motivated by affection. It just means
that, regardless of such affection, Judaism requires individuals to give it whether they
want to or not. Somewhat similarly, hesed, which originally meant "an act done out of
loyalty to one's fellow," is now also used to describe acts of kindness, care, and concern.
Therefore, by definition, acts of hesed are less binding on Jewish people than are acts of
zedakah, yet they still exact some degree of duty beyond that suggested by the word
charity. Dorff, supra note 292, at 181-82.
294. Mackler, supra note 292, at 421; see also Leviticus 19:16 ('[D]o not stand upon
the blood of your neighbor. .. ."); Goodwin, supra note 134, at 796 ("R]nlike common law,
Jewish law imposes an affirmative duty to save a person's life through one's direct
intervention or through the use of one's resources.").
295. Broyde, supra note 280, at 58. The spirit of the requirement is captured in the
Talmudic passage regarding the creation of Adam: "[Alnyone who destroys a single person
from the children of man [Adam] is considered by Scripture as if he destroyed an entire
world, and whoever sustains a single person from the children of man is considered as if
he sustained an entire world." See Talmud, Sanhedrin 37a.
296. See, e.g., Broyde, supra note 280, at 58 ('Tampering with nature is part of the
human mission in the Jewish tradition; curing illness is one facet of that mission."). The
primary mitzvah to save someone's life or preserve their health, if possible, is derived
from the biblical mandate to return a lost object. See Deuteronomy 22:2 ("[Tlhen you shall
give it back to him .... ").
297. See Deuteronomy 22:2.
298. The commandment to preserve life is derived from Leviticus 18:5, which says,
"You shall keep My laws and My rules, by the pursuit of which man shall live...." The
Sages have since deduced from this verse, "You shall live by them, but not die by them,"
implying that one of the main purposes of the commandment is to preserve human life.
Halperin, supra note 38, at 411; see Leviticus 19:16 ("Do not go about as a talebearer
among your fellows. Do not stand upon the blood of your neighbor: I am the Lord."); J. D.
Kunin, The Search for Organs: Halachic Perspectives on Altruistic Giving and the Selling
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superior requirement of all but three prohibitions of Jewish law:
worshipping false gods, certain illicit sexual actions, and causing
injury or death to innocent people. 9
It might, therefore, appear at first impression that halacha
not only condones organ donation to save lives but, perhaps, even
requires it.3"' The decision to donate one's organ, however,
involves balancing halakhic obligations."'
The primary conflicting obligation to mandating donating
organs under Jewish law derives from the mitzvah to preserve
one's own life, which includes the responsibility to avoid self-
injury.02 Thus, "If A's life is in danger and B can save A without
endangering his own life, he must do so. If B can only save A by
sacrificing his own life, he may not do so. ""' However, one may,
indeed must, risk self-injury for the purpose of rescuing someone
else if the risk to oneself is only minimal0 4 and when the
of Organs, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 269, 269 (2005) (interpreting Leviticus 19:16 and explaining
that Maimonides states, "[alnybody who is able to save someone else and fails to do so
transgresses the mitzvah of 'Do not stand idly by the blood of your brother."'); Mackler,
supra note 292, at 421-22 ("Saving a life justifies virtually any action that is otherwise
prohibited by Judaism.... Furthermore, violating provisions of Jewish law in order to
save a life is not only permitted but required."). Moses Nahmanides, a medieval physician
and rabbi wrote, '[slaving life is a great mitzvah [commandment]. Who approaches it with
alacrity is praised, who hesitates is despicable, who questions it is guilty of murder, and
certainly so, one who despairs and does not do it." Id. at 422.
299. Halperin, supra note 38, at 411-12.
300. Kunin, supra note 298, at 269.
301. See id.
302. 1 DAVID DAUBE, Talmudic Law, in COLLECTED WORKS OF DAVID DAUBE:
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE LEGAL HISTORY 44, 55-56 (Calum M. Carmichael ed., 1992);
FAITEL LEVIN, HALACHA, MEDICAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTEMPORARY HALACHA ISSUES 78-79 (1987); J. David Bleich, Survey of Recent
Halakhic Periodical Literature, TRADITION, Spring 1993, at 59, 60-61; Cohen, supra note
224, at 43-44 ('[It is forbidden for a person to intentionally cause physical damage to his
own body."); Kunin, supra note 298, at 269; Mayer, supra note 281, at 70.
303. Halperin, supra note 38, at 412.
304. The Jerusalem Talmud teaches that one is obligated to help a person in definite
danger when the risk of injuring oneself is merely potential. As new issues arise, halakhic
authorities rely on precedent from the Talmud much as secular courts rely on precedent
from prior court rulings. Kunin, supra note 298, at 270; see also LEVIN, supra note 302, at
81-82 ("Where nothing [substantial] is given of the body and only a minimal possibility of
danger to life exists, the Torah's injunction 'Do not stand by your brother's blood!' is
applicable: life-saving must be undertaken."); Cohen, supra note 224, at 45-46 (noting
that some polkim (deciders of Jewish law) feel that it is required for one to be willing to
save the life of another when pain is the only risk involved); Reichman, supra note 285, at
22 (declaring that a donor's obligation includes subjecting herself to a certain amount of
risk); Sinclair, supra note 216, at 590 (asserting that one is permitted to risk minor self-
injury for the sake of saving someone else's life); American Red Cross, supra note 268
("Judaism teaches that saving a human life takes precedence over maintaining the
sanctity of the human body.").
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rescuee's need is substantial.3 "' Thus, blood donations are
halakhically required."°6 Several authorities also maintain that
less than a fifty percent risk of harm or death to the rescuer is
minimal risk for the purposes of saving another's life,"7 as it
might be with saving someone from drowning.3 s On the other
hand, Jewish law does not require one to undergo substantial
risk of injury or death to save a life.09 Where risk of endangering
oneself is high, rescuing someone from death constitutes the act
of a "pious fool."31 Jewish law applies the same reasoning to the
decision to undergo medical treatment that will save someone
else's life.31" '
305. See Cohen, supra note 224, at 40 (asserting that the Yerushalmi, Terumot orders
that one must attempt to save the life of someone in definite danger of dying when the
risk of harm from the rescue is merely potential); Halperin, supra note 39, at 48 (noting
that Rabbi Akiba concluded in the Mishna that there is an exception to the prohibition
against self-injury when there is "great need"); Halperin, supra note 38, at 412, 419
(noting that halakhic authorities reject the teaching of the Palestinian Talmud that an
individual must save the life of another person when there is risk of endangering but not
of sacrificing his own life, and that while one may injure himself for a "great" benefit, one
must not allow self-injury for only a minor benefit).
306. Halperin, supra note 38, at 413-14.
307. Sinclair, supra note 216, at 590.
308. See LEVIN, supra note 302, at 80 (repeating the Torah's instruction, "Do not
stand by your brother's blood!" and stating it is universally interpreted to mean that one
must, for example, save someone in danger of drowning or at the mercy of a criminal).
309. See Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 186 (asserting that Leviticus 25:36
instructs, "Your brother shall live with you," which should be taken to mean that his life
does not take precedence over one's own and should not therefore be saved at the expense
of sacrificing one's own life); Halperin, supra note 39, at 47 (asserting that no one is
obligated to donate an organ to save the life of someone else); Kunin, supra note 298, at
269-70 (recounting that Rabbi David ben Rabbi Shlomo Ibn (Abi) Zimra (RaDBaZ) wrote,
"[In trying to save another life,] if there is any doubt of threat to [your] life, [saving
another's life over your own] is piety of idiocy because your possible danger takes
precedence over your fellow man's definite danger."); Sinclair, supra note 216, at 589-90
("The generally accepted position is that an individual is not obligated to risk life or limb
in order to save another person from certain death."). Only the Jerusalem Talmud
requires one to undertake substantial risk to save the life of another person. Hagahot
Maimaniyot, a commentary on Rambam, taught that one may be obligated under the
Jerusalem Talmud to attempt to save the life of someone in need, even when such
attempted rescue could seriously endanger the rescuer. In particular, he argues that
saving the life of someone who is in definite danger is required whenever the risk of harm
from attempting rescue is merely potential, the reason being that the need of the one at
risk of losing his or her life is of greater value than that of the rescuer. By his reasoning,
one would be required to donate a kidney to save the life of a renal patient, despite the
risk of harm to the donor. However, this is a minority view. LEVIN, supra note 302, at 78-
79.
310. LEVIN, supra note 302, at 81 (citing noted rabbis of the fifteenth century).
311. See Sinclair, supra note 216, at 589-90 (arguing that because a person does not
own his or her life, the person is required to participate in a life saving medical procedure
unless the risk of harm is high or when coercion is used so that its negative consequences
outweigh the treatment's positive results).
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Donating a kidney, however, differs from many other life-
saving methods referenced in Jewish texts.31 ' When a person
dives into water to rescue someone from drowning, even if the
rescue proves unsuccessful, the diver's body will remain in one
piece. Therefore, since the diver will most likely survive the
rescue and remain intact, Jewish law requires that he or she
attempt to save the person from drowning. Kidney donations
differ in that even if the donor remains perfectly healthy after
the procedure, the donor will no longer be whole because he or
she will be missing a kidney.313 Jewish law restricts disfiguring or
dismembering the human body. This obligation derives from the
requirement ordering immediate burial of the dead without
removing the organs from the body, known as nivul hamet or
"desecration of the dead body."" 4 Jewish law generally requires
near immediate burial of the dead out of respect for the human
body."5 Indeed, belief in an afterlife where "spirits ... look like
the embodied people they were in life" contributes to the
reluctance among the more conservative members of the Jewish
faith to approve of organ donations.31 However, Jewish tradition
believes that it was G-d who donated the first body part by
removing Adam's rib and transferring it to Eve in her creation.3'
Rabbi Yechezkel Landau, a prominent Rabbinical authority of
the eighteenth century, thus concluded that the obligation to
save human life transcends the biblical prohibition on
dismembering the body's parts."8 For example, he ruled that
even though the Halacha usually forbids autopsies, they are
permitted for ascertaining the cause of death when used to save a
human life in imminent danger. Moreover, the self-injury that
most impacts the halakhic prohibition is that harm that has no
312. LEVIN, supra note 302, at 81.
313. Id.
314. Shabtai A. Rappoport, Medicine and Halacha, The Deceased, the Family and
Organ Donation, http://www.daat.ac.il/daat/refua/donation.htm (last visited Jan. 31,
2009); see also Deuteronomy 21:22-23 ("fflou must not let his corpse remain on the stake
overnight, but must bury him the same day.").
315. See Mackler, supra note 292, at 422 (explaining how the Jewish tradition values
respect for the human body, commanding certain requirements after death including
burial of the body as soon as possible).
316. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 128.
317. See Reuven P. Bulka, Psychology, Halakhah, and Organ Transplantation,
TRADITION, Winter 1989, at 3, 3 (describing this first surgery as a "unique form of
transplantation").
318. See Daniel Eisenberg, Sanctity of the Human Body: Do We Own Our Bodies or
Are They Only Out on Loan?, AISH.COM, Jan. 13, 2003, http://www.aish.com/
societyWorksciencenature/Sanctity-of the HumanBodyl.asp (recounting the opinion of
Rabbi Landau that a transplant should not be done unless "an identifiable human life
may be saved").
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countervailing benefit.319 Because donating a kidney will improve
or save the life of another individual, authorities generally
believe that it should not be considered self-mutilation within the
context of Jewish law.
320
Rabbi David ben Rabbi Shlomo Ibn (Abi) Zimra, known as
the acronym RaDBaZ, was a noted Rabbi of the fifteenth
century.2' The RaDBaZ analyzed the issue of what to do if a ruler
threatened to kill someone unless another would cut out a
322nonvital organ. Quoting Proverbs 3:17, which says that the
Torah's3 3 "ways... are ways of pleasantness," the RaDBaZ ruled
that Halacha does not require one to amputate a body part for
the sake of saving someone else's life; however, he suggested it
would certainly be a "pious act" to willingly sacrifice the body
part, unless its removal endangered the donor, in which case the
donor would be dismissed as a "pious fool.
3 24
Therefore, given that the weight Jewish law affords saving
lives and healing the injured, most Jewish authorities allow
kidney donations because the benefits greatly outweigh the
319. See Kunin, supra note 298, at 271 (noting that Rabbi Feinstein permits cosmetic
surgery as halakhically acceptable because its intended purpose is to improve rather than
to injure the individual). Admittedly, however, cosmetic surgery differs from organ
donation because whereas the injury from cosmetic surgery itself directly benefits the
individual undergoing cosmetic repair, the injury incurred from donating an organ
benefits only the organ recipient. See Cohen, supra note 224, at 44 (explaining Rabbi
Feinstein's view that injuring oneself in a degrading manner is not permitted while self-
injury is allowed when there is a benefit); Halperin, supra note 39, at 48 (discussing
Jewish opinions as well as the Torah commandment of bal tashchit, prohibiting
unnecessary self-mutilation causing permanent damage).
320. Kunin, supra note 298, at 270 (reporting that according to a U.S. national
survey, the mortality rate of those donating a kidney was only 0.03%).
321. Chabad.org, Rabbi David Ibn Zimra (RaDBaZ)-Early Achronim,
http://www.chabad.org/library/article-cdo/aid/112491jewish/Rabbi-David-Ibn-Zimra-
RaDBaZ.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2009).
322. Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 186.
323. The Torah refers to the first five books of the Old Testament, which is believed
by more observant Jews to have been dictated by G-d to Moses on Mt. Sinai when G-d
gave the tablets containing the Ten Commandments. STEPHEN M. WYLEN, THE SEVENTY
FACES OF TORAH 8 (2005) (explaining in detail this "standard belief' among Jews).
324. LEVIN, supra note 302, at 79 (stating that one is entitled to prioritize his own
life over that of others); Cohen, supra note 224, at 45 ("[The Torah's] ways are ways of
pleasantness ... and it is necessary that the laws of our Torah will accord with reason
and rational thought. How could it occur to us that a person should allow his eyes to be
blinded or his hands to be cut off.., so that his friend should not be killed? Therefore, I
cannot countenance any ruling [such as] this, other than an act of outstanding piety
[midat chassidut]. Blessed is the portion of one who can withstand this; however, if there
is [even] a possible danger to his life [in the procedure], then he is a pious fool [chassid
shoteh], for the potential danger to his own life takes precedence over the certain [danger]
for his friend." (quoting the RaDBaZ at the end of his teshuva)); Grazi & Wolowelsky,
supra note 168, at 186.
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risks. 25 While it certainly is not obligatory to donate an organ,
donating a kidney constitutes an act of piety.26
2. Jewish Law on Payment to the Organ Donor. Jewish law
does not permit payment for performing a mitzvah.327  For
instance, one may not receive payment for sharing information
about the Torah.32 This principle extends beyond teachings of the
Torah; it applies also to carrying out the commandments of the
Torah. 9 Because the Torah commandments include healing the
injured, one may not seek payment for the specific acts of
healthcare.33 ° The Torah, however, makes an exception for
receiving payment for performing a mitzvah when the individual
would otherwise be forced to carry out the mitzvah at his or her
own expense.33' Thus, doctors can be paid for their time (sechar
batala) as well as expenses.3 2 From this, Jewish law derives that
the suffering a donor necessarily incurs throughout the donation
process secures the donor the right to demand compensation,
despite fulfilling a mitzvah.333  Even were Jewish doctors
prohibited by Jewish law from charging patients,3 4 organ donors
differ in that they have not assumed a previous obligation to
provide healthcare--like doctors have.335
325. See, e.g., Dorff, supra note 292, at 182 ("When the danger is not great... then
people may donate an organ, and it is, in those circumstances, an honored, godly thing to
do."); Mayer, supra note 281, at 70 ("Kidney donations are permitted because of the
overriding consideration of saving a life."); Reichman, supra note 285, at 22 ("Living organ
donation, for organs such as kidneys, is a common, halakhically sanctioned practice.").
The same standard does not apply to children or the mentally incompetent under Jewish
law. See Bleich, supra note 302, at 69 (recognizing a "best interest standard" for minors
and mentally incompetent persons).
326. See Cohen, supra note 224, at 48 ("[D]onating an organ to save someone else's
life, while not mandatory, is nevertheless a great mitzvah. .. ."); Halperin, supra note 38,
at 414 ("[Dlonating a kidney for lifesaving purpose... is not obligatory.").
327. Cohen, supra note 224, at 49.
328. Halperin, supra note 38, at 420.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 421.
331. See id. (noting that a healer may receive compensation for his expenses, time,
and anything given to the patient during the healing process). Donating an organ strictly
for financial gain is disallowed. Cutting one's hair for commercial purposes is not
forbidden because it is not self-injury. Donating blood falls somewhere in the middle,
because a blood donor feels only slight discomfort. Halperin, supra note 39, at 49.
332. See Cohen, supra note 224, at 50 (explaining that helping someone is a mitzvah,
but a doctor or anyone else may demand to be paid if he or she is not prepared to do it
without pay); Halperin, supra note 38, at 421 ("[Tlhe fulfillment of a commandment does
not require that the healer spend his own money for the patient.").
333. Halperin, supra note 38, at 421.
334. Some argue that one may not receive payment for the actions he or she is
obligated to perform. Id.
335. Id. at 421-22.
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Moreover, while one may not be paid for performing a
mitzvah, receiving compensation while performing a mitzvah is
not prohibited as long as the individual has some
nonremunerative motive to perform the mitzvah.33 In fact, when
an organ recipient can offer repayment for damage caused to the
donor, he or she must do so.117 The poskim "fram[e] the payment
as the 'fine' imposed on someone who commits a bodily assault on
another, which includes payment for pain and suffering in
addition to medical expenses and lost income."338 Moreover,
Jewish law recognizes the complexity of motivations in obtaining
compensation when performing a mitzvah. For example, if a
destitute father hoping to help cure his child's sickness would be
willing to give her a kidney, should Jewish law allow him to sell a
kidney to pay for her medical care? 39 Separating oblique altruism
from the financial gain may prove difficult.34 ° As a consequence,
the late Chief Rabbi of Israel, Shlomo Goren, concluded that
there is "no halakhic basis on which to prohibit one from
donating a kidney in consideration of financial gain."341
336. Kunin, supra note 298, at 272; see also Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 285, at
251 ("[TIhe religious value of a mitzvah ... is not obviated by the absence or diminution of
proper motivation.").
337. JOSEPH CARO, SHULCHAN ARUCH § 426 (Marcus ed., 1995) ("But, if he [the one
being saved] has money to save himself, he must pay it to his friend [the one who saved
him]."); 12 ARYEH KAPLAN, THE TORAH ANTHOLOGY, LEVITICUS - II, at 27 (Aryeh Akplan
ed., Moznaim Publishing 1990) ("[11f one sees his neighbor in danger and has the ability to
do something, he must do everything in his power to help him.... If one spends money to
save his neighbor's life, and his neighbor has the ability to repay him, the neighbor has an
obligation to do so."); MAIMONIDES, MISHNE TORAH, BOOK OF DAMAGES, 510-11, 511 n.45
(Moznaim Publishing 1997) ("Whenever a person can save another person's life, but he
fails to do so, he transgresses a negative commandment, as (Leviticus 19:16] states: 'Do
not stand [idly by] while your brother's blood [is at stake]. .. .' Needless to say, the person
whose life was saved must afterwards reimburse the person who saved it for the expenses
he undertook."); Hagahot Mordekhai, Sanhedrin, sec. 718 (declaring that a person may
cut off the limb of another in order to save his own life "but must pay him the value of his
hand"); Rosh, Baba Kamma 6:12; Sanhedrin 8:12 (noting that the victim whose life has
been saved must compensate the rescuer for expenses); Tur Shulhan Arukh, Choshen
Mishpat 426:1 (again declaring that a person may cut off the limb of another in order to
save his own life); Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 187 ("A person who is injured
by another is allowed to collect not only for his medical expenses and lost income, but also
for pain and suffering. One who volunteers to be injured in order to save another does not
forfeit similar compensation.").
338. Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 285, at 252. The late Chief Rabbi of Israel,
Shlomo Goren, wrote that receiving financial compensation for donating an organ does
not lessen the mitzvah. He believed that the payment does not make it less commendable.
See Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 186.
339. See Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 187 (discussing the different views
on this issue).
340. Id.
341. Id. at 186 (emphasis added).
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While Jewish law permits compensation for organ donation,
it concurrently warns against using wealth and power to
improperly influence others into making unwise decisions.342 And
it recognizes that those desperate for money more commonly
ignore adverse medical effects.343 Without full consideration of the
donation's medical consequences, donor consent will be invalid.3"
However, while "[s] elling organs does involve an ethical problem
[for those that are desperate],... it is one that relates to the
general society and not to the individual buyer or seller," notes
Shafran, director of the Jerusalem Rabbinate's Department of
Halakaha and Medicine.345 "This is a question of society's ethics,"
continues Shafron, "but it involves no technical halakhic
prohibition."346 Even Yisrael Meir Lau, former Chief Rabbi of
Israel, who has expressed concern that a market for transplant
organs will enable exclusively the well-off to receive organ
transplants, admits that providing financial compensation to
organ donors does not violate Jewish ethical considerations.347
The poor often experience disadvantages in competing for limited
resources.348 Government regulation of legal kidney sales, in
Rabbi Lau's opinion, most effectively avoids the current
exploitation in the black market transplant organ industry.
349
E. Nonreligious Objections to Paying Organ Providers
Transplant tourism has given rise to fierce debates, inter
alia, among ethicists, lawyers, doctors, and economists about
legalizing and regulating the sale of kidneys."' Several proposals
have been put forth in the past to adopt a free market allowing
organs to be sold for whatever price consumers will pay."'
Americans, in particular, prefer free market systems over models
of altruism,352 and the majority of Americans approve of offering
342. Cohen, supra note 224, at 64.
343. Halperin, supra note 38, at 423.
344. Id.




349. Id.; see also Halperin, supra note 38, at 422 (recommending legislative
regulation of kidney sales to prevent exploitation of the poor).
350. See Friedman & Friedman, supra note 5, at 961 (illustrating that associations
and professionals can be found on all sides of the debate); Rohter, supra note 9 (citing
disagreement among groups that believe selling organs will extend autonomy and groups
that fear it will promote coercion).
351. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 214.
352. See Jefferies, supra note 72, at 653 ("[The] free market system enjoys its
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organ donors compensation.353 But, ethical objections and the
potential for abuse in an open market for organs have to date
prevented such a payment system.354
The objections are myriad. "Among the[m] [] are that a
market will drive down altruism and deter such donors from
giving at all; children will murder their parents for organs; that
dirty tissue will enter the organ pool; and commoditization will
be 'like slavery."'3 5 Proposals to compensate organ donors trigger
thoughts of "an impoverished third-world mother selling her
organs to a distant multimillionaire whose financial wherewithal
has enabled him to bypass any national waitlist."356 Many
consider compensating kidney providers immoral.357 Distributive
justice often also forms the basis for objection. According to The
Transplantation Society,358 "Organs and tissues should be freely
given without commercial consideration or commercial profit.'3 59
The arguments against generating a market system for kidneys,
however, generally do not rest in economics.'
By criminalizing organ sales, NOTA has attempted to
increase altruistic donations, eliminate commoditization of the
human body, and prevent exploitation. 6' However, these benefits
must be balanced "against the thousands of Americans dying on
waitlists who [are] sacrificed for these ideals."362 Altruistic
donations have failed at meeting the demand for kidney
greatest popularity in the United States. Americans accept the market as an alternative
to altruistic systems and the coercive power of the state.").
353. See Watkins, supra note 12, at 24 (noting that some 52% of Americans
supported paying organ donors, 5% had reservations, and 2% considered it "immoral or
unethical").
354. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 214.
355. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 151; see also Becker & Elias, supra note 3, at 22
("[Alnother argument raised against paying for organs is that it might reduce the supply
of organs for altruistic reasons.").
356. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1121.
357. Robinson, supra note 71, at 1042.
358. The Transplantation Society, Vision Statement, http://www.transplantation-
soc.org/policy.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) ('The Transplantation Society will provide
the focus for global leadership in transplantation [with]: [the] development of the science
and clinical practice[,] scientific communication[,] continuing education[,] [and] guidance
on the ethical practice ....").
359. Michael Abecassis et al., Consensus Statement on the Live Organ Donor, 284 J.
AM. MED. ASS'N 2919, 2925 (2000); Friedman & Friedman, supra note 5, at 961 (stating
that medical associations worldwide generally discourage offering compensation for
human organs).
360. See Jefferies, supra note 72, at 654 (noting that most arguments opposing a
market in organ donation are philosophical rather than economic).
361. Watkins, supra note 12, at 26.
362. Id. (quoting Michael Davis, Market for Human Organs: How Much Is That
Kidney in the Window?, THE VANDERBILT TORCH, Feb. 13, 2002, at 1).
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transplants.363 The ban on organ sales places a substantial
burden on people's access to medical care.3u Continuing the
altruistic model of procurement essentially means that we would
rather accept the deaths resulting from the failure to supply an
adequate number of organs than offer compensation to donors.6
The concern for personal autonomy is preserved at the expense of
failing to eliminate the organ supply shortage. 366 "Paying for
organs is morally odious, mainly to those who are not dying to
get one."
367
1. The Concern that a Kidney Market Will Displace
Altruistic Donations. Some fear that once kidneys are priced,
altruistic donors will likely drop out of the market or, instead,
become organ sellers themselves. 6 "There is concern that a
system which allows payment for transplantable organs will
deter a voluntary donor who considers a payment system
unethical or unsavory."369 Critics cite, for instance, that in
Kuwait, "several well-matched relatives of potential
recipients.., withdrew their offer of donation after they learned
that their relatives [could] go to India and buy a kidney in the
market place."37°
But allowing a market for human organs would not require
donors to accept compensation for their organs; they could and,
more importantly, would often still donate freely.3 7' As evidence
of this fact, we need only examine the market to compensate
donors of blood products, which has not hindered those who wish
to donate blood voluntarily.3 72 Nonprofit institutions collect
363. Id.
364. Volokh, supra note 29, at 1835-36.
365. Goodwin, supra note 134, at 794.
366. Jefferies, supra note 72, at 651.
367. Berman, supra note 241, at 15.
368. Anderson, supra note 28, at 300.
369. Robinson, supra note 71, at 1039.
370. See MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE BY OWNER: HUMAN ORGANS,
TRANSPLANTATION, AND THE MARKET 14 (2005) (quoting G.M. Abouna et al.,
Commercialization in Human Organs: A Middle Eastern Perspective, TRANSPLANTATION
PROCEEDINGS, 1990, at 918, 919).
371. See Magda Slabbert & Hennie Oosthuizen, Commercialization of Human
Organs for Transplantation: A View from South Africa, 24 MED. & L. 191, 198 (2005)
(pointing out that although some are paid to work, there are still those who volunteer).
372. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 152 ("Blood market and donor systems illuminate
the false dichotomy that suggests that voluntary donation and compensation for biological
resources cannot mutually exist."); Sobota, supra note 12, at 1246 (reasoning that there is
nothing to suggest a reduction of altruistic blood donations, even though donors have the
option to receive compensation).
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roughly fourteen million units of blood a year.373 Similarly, the
market system for producing eggs has not precluded altruistic
incentives for donations.374 It coexists with altruism and functions
more effectively than an altruistic model alone would at
satisfying the demand for eggs.37 No valid empirical evidence
demonstrates that any possible drop in altruistic donors would
not be significantly offset by the gain in organs obtained from
permitting kidney sales.376 Indeed, there can be little debate that
"the greater the payment, the greater the increase in
transplantable organs. " "'
Similarly, some worry that the psychic benefits should be
protected at the cost of preventing payment for kidneys. Kidney
donors, however, would likely experience positive feelings about
making a contribution notwithstanding the receipt of
compensation. Many transplant surgeons certainly feel gratified
when they save a patient's life even though they receive
remuneration. 8 Critics of the all-volunteer U.S. Army at one
time claimed that paying people to join the army would drive
away those who would join for other, perhaps patriotic, reasons."
But instead, people enlist in the U.S. Army for all sorts of
reasons-some economic, some not."' Indeed, after the terrorist
attacks on 9/11, interest in volunteering in the U.S. armed forces
surged as a result of renewed patriotic convictions.38'
373. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 152 (stating that 45% is donated to the Red Cross,
42% to blood banks, and just under 12% to hospitals).
374. Id. at 181-82.
375. Moving to an altruistic model would severely diminish the number of donors
and, as a result, lead to longer waitlists, and inequitable rationing. Id. at 182.
376. Two studies conducted in the context of blood donations indicate that
compensation is more likely to attract donors than to repel them. One survey reveals that
donors who feel encouraged by compensation to donate blood substantially outnumber
donors stating they would feel discouraged. Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human
Tissues for Stem Cell Research, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 45, 48 (2007). In another survey, 76% of
New Zealand blood donors said they would continue to donate even if compensation were
paid to other donors, whereas only 7% said they no longer would. Id. at 60. Moreover, to
the extent that allowing kidney sales diminishes altruistic donations, the drop in
altruistic donations will most likely be "because some former volunteers would decide to
sell their organs." CHARLES C. HINKLEY II, MORAL CONFLICTS OF ORGAN RETRIEVAL: A
CASE FOR CONSTRUCTIVE PLURALISM 107 (2005). Therefore, the likely "loss" of altruistic
donations resulting from a payment system would not result in any loss in the total
number of kidneys made available to patients.
377. HINKLEY, supra note 376, at 107.
378. Volokh, supra note 29, at 1835 n.102.
379. Becker & Elias, supra note 3, at 22.
380. Id.
381. Rick Hampson, 9/11 Recruits: They Enlisted When USA Was Under Fire, USA
TODAY, Sept. 9, 2005, httpJ/www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-09-08-9-11-recruits-
coverx.htm.
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2. The Concern that Legalizing the Sale of Kidneys Will
Compromise Human Dignity. Critics also oppose compensating
kidney donors out of a reluctance to commodify the human body
because doing so, they say, dehumanizes society.-" 2  The
suggestion is that "the human body especially belongs in that
category of things that defy or resist commensuration-like love
or friendship or life itself.""3 According to philosopher Immanuel
Kant, "a human being is not entitled to sell his limbs for money,
even if he were offered ten thousand thalers for a single finger. '
However, we already commodify our bodies all the time. We have
gone so far as to determine the worth of our body parts for
compensation models pertaining to accidents covered by workers'
compensation, tortious and criminal injury, and injury obtained
during military service.385  Admittedly, these are post-hoc
payment systems, but we also commodify other body parts for
direct sale, such as blood products, sperm, ova, skin, hair, and
even saliva."' The prohibitions of NOTA do not include the sale of
382. UNOS REPORT, supra note 10; Abecassis et al., supra note 359, at 2925;
Stimson, supra note 77, at 360; Andrew Wancata, Note, No Value for a Pound of Flesh:
Extending Market-Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & HEALTH 199, 204 (2003)
(referencing University of Southern California law professor Margaret Radin, who argues
that "[b]y making something nonsalable we proclaim that it should not be conceived of or
treated as a commodity") (quoting Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1855 (1987))).
383. Volokh, supra note 29, at 1843 (quoting Leon R. Kass, Organs for Sale?
Propriety, Property, and the Price of Progress, 107 PUB. INT. 65, 81 (1992)); see also
Korobkin, supra note 376, at 55-56 (comparing the selling of human tissue to the selling
of human babies); Satel, supra note 26, at 64 ("Organ donation, we are told, should be the
ultimate gift: the 'gift of life,' a sublime act of generosity. The giver-whether living or
deceased-must not expect to be enriched in any way.").
384. Noam J. Zohar, Toward Justice in the Organ Trade, 27 ISR. L. REV. 541, 558
(1993) (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS 124 (Louis Infield trans., 1963))
(explaining Kant's reasoning as follows: by exchanging one's finger to turn a profit, an
individual treats him- or herself as a means only rather than as an end); see also JAMES
STACEY TAYLOR, STAKES AND KIDNEYS: WHY MARKETS IN HUMAN BODY PARTS ARE
MORALLY IMPERATIVE 16 (2005).
385. Roff, supra note 209, at 51 (reporting that the U.K. Criminal Injuries
Compensation Authority provides victims £2,500 ($4,848) for a fractured tailbone, £3,800
($7,369) for a hernia, and £22,000 ($42,662) for the loss of a kidney; in addition, the
Marshall Islands nuclear claims tribunal have paid, inter alia, $75,000 for kidney cancer).
386. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 181 (noting that federal law forbids the sale of
human organs, but not sperm and ova); Becker & Elias, supra note 3, at 21 ("[Ihf women
can be paid to host the eggs of other women and bear their children-as they can in the
United States-why cannot men and women get paid for selling their organs to save the
lives of others?"); Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 213, 230-31 (revealing that there is
currently a thriving market for human blood, tissue, and reproductive cells and stating
that women are compensated between $4,000 and $35,000 for egg donations); Roff, supra
note 209, at 51 ("The UK is one of the minority of countries that still rely on
predominantly voluntary donations of blood."); Sobota, supra note 12, at 1236 ("[MIarkets
for human body parts already exist, specifically for blood, blood products, sperm, eggs,
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human "tissues" and "cells" sold for research, commercial, or
other purposes.387 In fact, "[Eighty-five] percent of blood plasma
donors are paid for their donations.""'
Sperm and eggs, too, are actively purchased and sold.389
Reproductive fertility has become a $3 billion industry.39 °
Similarly, a Google search for "egg donation + compensation"
returns approximately 41,500 results.3 9' Sperm donors typically
receive $45 for a single donation or $200 per week for six months
of weekly donations, with the highest bids reaching $15,000 for a
single donation."' Ova, on the other hand, command a higher
selling price due to their greater scarcity and because fewer
women agree to part with their eggs without significant
compensation.3 93 Fertility centers throughout the United States
compensate women an average of $5,000 per egg donation, 94 and
some hopeful parents pay women who possess rare and sought-
after genetic traits, such as high intelligence or attractiveness, as
much as $100,000 for a single egg harvest.395 In contrast, Britain
and even human hair."); Wancata, supra note 382, at 221 (identifying gametes as
alienable personal property that can be bought and sold as a market commodity); Joshua
Weisman, Organs as Assets, 27 ISR. L. REv. 610, 615 (1993) (noting that some states
permit the sale of blood and blood products); Jodie Snyder, The High Price of Women's
Eggs: Young Donors Get Lucrative Offers as Couples Seek Fertility Assistance, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, May 30, 2006, at 1A (estimating that reproductive fertility assists in roughly
50,000 babies each year). Note that some oppose even selling tissue. See HINKLEY, supra
note 376, at 110 ("I am inclined to think that selling blood, eggs, and semen is immoral
when retrieved from living persons.").
387. U.S. CONGRESS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 175, at 76. Although Congress
explicitly prohibits property rights in human organs, it has made an exception in NOTA
for tissues that can be replenished, such as blood and sperm. Jefferies, supra note 72, at
632. Similarly, nearly every state statute exempts human readily renewable tissues. See
Gloria J. Banks, Legal & Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society's Most Vulnerable
Participants in a Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45,
73 (1995) (citing specific state statutes).
388. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1108. Additionally, payment for surrogate motherhood
is legal. Finkel, supra note 3, at 32. And, courts have even recognized that body parts can
generate income. In Hess v. Commissioner, for example, the U.S. Tax Court allowed the
stripper known as "Chesty Love" to deduct the expense of her breast implants as a "stage
prop." Hess v. Comm'r, No. 11036-92S, 1994 T.C.M. 88, at *3-5 (Mar. 30, 1994).
389. Recruitment for sperm and egg donations currently appear on websites, bus
kiosks, and in magazines and college newspapers. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 160; Sobota,
supra note 12, at 1242.
390. Snyder, supra note 386.
391. Korobkin, supra note 376, at 57.
392. Wancata, supra note 382, at 221.
393. See Debora Spar, The Egg Trade-Making Sense of the Market for Human
Oocytes, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1289, 1290-91 (2007) (discussing the reasons why women
would not volunteer to donate their eggs).
394. Id. at 1289.
395. Korobkin, supra note 376, at 49; Joel Schwarz, Women Who Have Donated Eggs
Sought for National Study, U. WASH. OFF. NEWS & INFO., Aug. 24, 2004,
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currently experiences a shortage in eggs for fertility treatment
exactly because donors are prohibited from receiving payment
beyond reimbursement for reasonable expenses."6
Opponents of organ markets tend to point out the renewable
nature of legally marketable body parts, usually referred to as
tissue-in contrast to organs.3 97 Even the U.S. legal system has
adopted this position by refusing to recognize a property interest
in human tissues and by treating the sale of blood products as
the sale of services rather than as the sale of goods."' This
distinction, however, is inaccurate at best, as some organs are
renewable and some tissues are not.399  For instance, a
transplanted liver section grows until it reaches normal size."'
And, a woman's eggs are not renewable; women possess only a
fixed quantity of eggs.4° Yet, the law permits commercial
transactions involving them. Like eggs, each individual possesses
a limited supply of kidneys. And donors of kidneys-like donors
of eggs---continue to live full and productive lives after
donation. °2 Moreover, should a donor's remaining kidney one day
fail, a donor could replenish it in a commoditized system by
obtaining an available kidney pursuant to the allocation method
developed."°3 Thus, the kidney is effectively "renewable" through
a market system.
http://uwnews.org/article.asp?articleID=5358; see also Snyder, supra note 386 (noting that
some recipients pay larger fees if the donor has high standardized exam scores or
graduated from an ivy-league school); Spar, supra note 393, at 1289 (identifying one
advertisement promising $25,000 for eggs of a "tall, athletic woman").
396. Spar, supra note 393, at 1291.
397. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs. ANN. § 333.10204 (West 2006) (excepting "whole
blood, blood plasma, blood products, blood derivatives, other self-replicating body fluids
[and] human hair"). Virginia legislation has grouped ova with renewable tissues and
excludes them from the ban on purchasing or selling human body parts. See VA. CODE
ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (repealed 2007) (excepting "hair, ova, blood, and other self-replicating
body fluids").
398. Sobota, supra note 12, at 1236-37.
399. Id. at 1236.
400. American Liver Foundation, Liver Transplant http://www.liverfoundation.org
education/info/transplant (last visited Jan. 31, 2009) ("Once transplanted, a piece of a
healthy liver can grow into a normal-size liver.").
401. EMILY JAcKSON, REGULATING REPRODUCTION: LAW, TECHNOLOGY AND
AUTONOMY 165-66 (2001) ("[Elach woman has a finite, if large, number of eggs....");
Sobota, supra note 12, at 1227. Though females cannot generate additional ova, each
female is born with a substantial number such that there is no realistic chance she will
run out, even if she donates some of them. See Press Release, Letisia Marquez, UCLA
Study Finds that Sperm Donors Are Less Valued than Egg Donors (May 23, 2007) (on file
with Houston Law Review).
402. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1109.
403. See Zohar, supra note 384, at 561 n.36 ("[T]he vendor could in principle buy
back ... a kidney, should the spare kidney fail.").
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Furthermore, the assertion that the sale of these tissues
constitutes a service rather than a sale of property presents a
false dichotomy. Those who buy sperm, eggs, blood, and any
other "tissue" are interested not in the process that produced the
product but, rather, desire to obtain the underlying biological
material. Moreover, one can just as easily characterize the sale of
a kidney as a service, wherein payment compensates for the
inconvenience, time, and discomfort associated with the
donation, rather than the kidney itself. This purely rhetorical
distinction merely functions to justify an existing illegitimate
division.
Finally, some point to the prohibitions on selling sex as a
prostitute, selling oneself into slavery, or committing suicide as
evidence that we restrict the commercialization of the human
body.4 °4 Again, this argument is misplaced. The law prohibits
prostitution and voluntary slavery not because the body or body
parts are transacted, but, rather, because of a social distaste for
the underlying activity. Indeed, the prohibition on suicide
demonstrates this point, as it implicates no financial transaction
at all. Of course, equating kidney sales with prostitution, slavery,
and suicide woefully undervalues the social benefit of the first.
3. The Concern for Economic "Coercion" of the Poor. Some
argue that the tantalization of remuneration will "coerce" the
poor so as to foreclose them from making a truly voluntary
decision to sell a kidney. °5 The claim, essentially, is that the poor
cannot act rationally in the face of the potential for significant
compensation. The argument not only demeans the ability of poor
people to think for themselves, it indeed contradicts how we
otherwise treat their right to make difficult decisions concerning
their lives and health.
The destitute, however, often work significantly more risky
and unpleasant jobs relative to the well-off. Coal mining, for
instance, is dangerous and associated with reduced lifespan.0 6 No
one seriously responds that instead of allowing those with limited
resources to work these jobs, only altruists or wealthy individuals
404. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 149-50 (suggesting that opponents of a market in
human organs could relate purchasing organs to buying sex from a prostitute because in
both situations, the purchaser has degraded themselves); Weisman, supra note 386, at
616 (listing one "additional reason that has been offered" against the market in human
organs idea as the fact "that human dignity must be safeguarded").
405. See Banks, supra note 387, at 86 ("When people are forced to sell their organs as
a means to support themselves or other family members, the voluntary nature of the
transplantation is tainted, if not destroyed.").
406. Korobkin, supra note 376, at 54.
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should perform such work.4"7 Soldiers, "coal miners, bridge
builders, firemen, police, and bomb disposal experts-all take
risks for differing degrees of societal benefit and financial
reward.""5 Similarly, we are hard-pressed to distinguish between
prohibiting individuals from selling kidneys and allowing them to
receive compensation for volunteering as subjects in drug
trials.4 9
Generally, economic security inversely relates to the value
potential donors place on future compensation from selling
kidneys .41 If the concern is that those living in poverty lack real
choice because of their financial situation, a decrease in their
economic prospects is ultimately unhelpful." "Trying to end
exploitation by prohibition is rather like ending slum dwelling by
bulldozing slums: it ends the evil in that form, but only by
making things worse for the victims.""'2
Instead of restricting employment choices in risky jobs only
to the well-off, the solution has been to make such work
environments as clean and as safe as possible and often offering
the workers a premium for undergoing the excessive risk.4" For
instance, the concern for unskilled laborers desperate enough to
work twelve-hour days in miserable conditions for less than
minimum wage led to laws that govern such employment-not
407. Id.
408. Berman, supra note 241, at 15. For instance, whereas the death rate from
donating a kidney is 0.03%, the mortality rate of commercial fishing is 0.1%, steel erecting
0.041%, and roofing 0.025%. Moreover, the risk of harm from dangerous employment is
many times underrepresented because employees do not always report their injuries out
of fear of punishment from their employers. See TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 126-27, 130.
409. Relatively poor individuals are usually the ones who participate in drug trials
because the procedure is inconvenient, painful, and entails some risk. Even so, public
policy encourages payment to these people because of the benefits. Gill & Sade, supra note
4, at 34.
410. J. Radcliffe-Richards et al., The Case for Allowing Kidney Sales, in THE ETHICS
OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT DEBATE, supra note 53, at 224, 226.
You think you're telling me something? Like, what, boxing is dangerous,
something like that? You don't think working triple shifts and at night on a
scaffold isn't just as likely to get a man killed? What about all those guys who
died last week living in cardboard shacks to save on rent money just to feed their
family, 'cause guys like you have not quite figured out a way yet to make money
off of watching that guy die? But in my profession-and it is my profession-I'm
a little more fortunate.
CINDERELLA MAN (Universal Pictures 2005) (quoting Russell Crowe as he portrays
depression-era heavyweight Jim Braddock).
411. See Radcliffe-Richards et al., supra note 410, at 225-26 ("If our ground for
concern is that the range of choices is too small, we cannot improve matters by removing
the best option that poverty has left, and making the range smaller still.").
412. Id. at 226.
413. Korobkin, supra note 376, at 54.
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the prohibition of it, which would leave these people worse off.414
Such regulations are part of a larger scheme to get those in
poverty hired at jobs with minimally decent conditions and, until
then, to provide welfare and job training.415 While certainly not
perfect, the system aims to expand opportunities, not eliminate
them. And the same could be designed for kidney sales programs,
so as to guarantee donors a minimum level of safety and
compensation, meaning "reasonable" people of any income level
could support the decision to donate.416
Moreover, there is a philosophical difference between
donating a kidney in response to an offer as a means for earning
needed income and donating a kidney in response to coercive
threats.4 7 Whereas threats resemble anything but a true offer
because they constrict a person's range of options, offers of
income actually enhance freedom.4 8 With an offer, the force
compelling the donor or laborer to act is not the offer itself, but
rather the alternative of remaining in a grim environment with a
scarcity of opportunities. 49 Accordingly, allowing people to sell
their kidneys does not coerce them because it broadens rather
than restricts their options.420 Offering people money to make a
choice they would not otherwise make is not coercive,42' it is why
most people demand compensation for employment. Simply, the
joy of the act alone does not suffice to motivate individuals to
perform. The payment acts as an additional, if not the only,
incentive. Where uncompensated donors must decide whether
the benefit of extending the life of another person justifies the
inconveniences and risks of undergoing surgery and continuing
life with only one kidney, compensated donors simply undertake
414. Gill & Sade, supra note 4, at 34.
415. Id.
416.
If the rich are free to engage in dangerous sports for pleasure, or dangerous jobs
for high pay, it is difficult to see why the poor who take the lesser risk of kidney
selling for greater rewards-perhaps saving relatives' lives, or extricating
themselves from poverty and debt-should be thought so misguided as to need
saving from themselves.
Finkel, supra note 3.
417. Zohar, supra note 384, at 554.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. See TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 52.
421. See Korobkin, supra note 376, at 51 ("As long as the donor is fully informed of
the risks and inconveniences involved and may choose to make the donation or not, the
decision is an equally voluntary one in both cases.").
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the same analysis with the additional consideration of receiving
422payment.
Interestingly, the data regarding women who choose to sell
their eggs shows that they are not typically poor, and the amount
they receive for each donation does not suggest an "undue
inducement to undergo the medical risks involved. 23 While this
analogy is not perfect-because I suspect that purchasers of eggs
often incorrectly associate the genetic makeup of the donors with
their social status-we, as a society, nonetheless, do not object
morally or legally to women undertaking the complex and painful
process of egg donation. Unfortunately, when someone "needs"
money, critics hold suspect his decision to sell biological material,
but when others do not "need" the money, critics presume valid
their decisions. In the latter case, the "need" or incentive must be
great enough to motivate the transaction; otherwise, the act
would have been done for free. Further, if the latter does not
"need" the remuneration, we could perhaps conclude that the
compensation would be disposed of on less critical expenditures.
By this analysis, we should be more willing to allow the
individual in true "need" to undertake the "risky" behavior than
the one seeking to make the more frivolous purchase with the
proceeds.
We must further not ignore that our current altruistic
system already suffers from forces that critics should recognize
as at least equally as "coercive" as financial incentives.
Specifically, social forces may influence the decision to donate
one's organ, whether for compensation or not. For example,
related donors may feel significant pressure from family
members to "donate" a kidney for a family member in kidney
failure.424 While one who receives financial compensation may
feel the pressure from his or her economic situation to part with
a kidney, the individual moved by "altruistic" motives might be
equally constrained.425
For example, the director of renal transplantation at
Massachusetts General Hospital, Francis Delmonico, faced an
"altruistic donor" who had written that he shouldered the
burden of severe pressures from a family member to donate part
of his liver to his only sibling.42 s The circumstance saddled his
422. Id.
423. Sobota, supra note 12, at 1245-46.
424. See Korobkin, supra note 376, at 53 ("[Plotential donors might perceive that a
refusal to donate will be punished with social ostracism.").
425. Kunin, supra note 298, at 270; Weisman, supra note 386, at 617.
426. Brian Vastag, Living-Donor Transplants Reexamined: Experts Cite Growing
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family with unbearable strains.427 Not wishing to back family
members into a corner to donate, some renal patients would
much prefer the anonymity offered by a market system for
kidneys.428 Similarly, there are the cases of "a daughter who
competed with her own mother to be the rescuer of another
family member and a woman who told researchers that her
motive for wanting to give a kidney to a stranger was to become
'Daddy's good girl.' 429 "Then there is the 'black-sheep donor,' a
wayward relative who shows up to offer an organ as an act of
redemption, hoping to reposition himself in the family's good
graces. For others, donation is a sullen fulfillment of familial
duty, a way to avoid the shame and guilt of allowing a relative
to suffer needlessly and even die."4 1 In McCall v. Shimp, a
cousin sought court intervention to compel his cousin to donate
his bone marrow because he happened to be the only suitable
donor for the transplant.42 ' Indeed, the potential of donor
"coercion" remains a crucial concern, particularly among
spousal donors.432
If, however, a market eliminated the kidney shortage, then
the family member could opt against donating her kidney and
allow the relative to obtain it through the distribution
mechanisms put into place for the market system.
Similarly, recipients often prefer to receive a kidney without
having to use this social "coercion." Recipients typically abhor the
need to beg friends and relatives to donate.433 Moreover,
recipients often prefer not to maintain a relationship with the
donor due to the desire to not feel an uncomfortable sense of
obligation to the donor.434 A commercial process would be near
anonymous, if not completely anonymous, depending on the
Concerns About Safety of Donors, 290 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 181, 182 (2003).
427. Id.
428. "'I wanted my donor to be completely anonymous so I could avoid the
treacherous intimacy of accepting an organ from someone I knew,'" remarked one renal
patient struggling to find a kidney donor. Satel, supra note 26, at 64.
429. Id. at 65.
430. Id.
431. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D. & C.3d 90, 90-91 (Pa. Com. P1. 1978); see also
Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1345 (Ill. 1990) (holding, similarly to McFall, that
family members may not compel an individual to act altruistically).
432. Soulillou, supra note 149, at 379 (some jurisdictions, such as France, prohibit
spousal donors); Terasaki, supra note 148, at 336 (spousal donations have an excellent
success rate).
433. Telephone Interview with Sally Satel, M.D., Kidney transplant patient and
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system developed.4 35 This would benefit both donor and recipient
by allowing each to feel free of any sense of obligation.436
Two related concerns involve the potential for (1) short-lived
economic benefits from selling a kidney;4 37  and (2) rash
decisionmaking in deciding to sell a kidney. Although ninety-six
percent of participants in a study involving 305 paid kidney
donors from India admitted undergoing the surgery to pay off
debt,4 38 only one-quarter of them succeeded in doing so within six
years after the operation.43 "The people who give their kidneys
spend all the money at once. Then afterwards they cannot work
properly," said a kiln owner in India whose workers are targeted
for kidney donations." ° Simple procedures, however, could vitiate
the concerns that transient economic needs or desires will drive
the decision to sell a kidney or that the donors will frivolously
dispose of the resultant income.
For example, donors could receive payment in the form of
annuities, compensation could be limited to noncash payments,
such as tuition reimbursement, or payment could be deferred
through contributions to a retirement account."' Similarly, we
can "(1) set a minimum sum for kidneys; (2) prohibit [poor]
persons... from being sellers; (3) only allow federally licensed
agencies to buy kidneys; (4) impose a six-month waiting
period.., and permit sellers to rescind the agreement at any
time; (5) require sellers to be [a minimum] .. . age; and
(6) require" medical screening and independent oversight.442
These devices appear paternalistic. They are, in part. But this
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 203 (commenting that among the false and harmful
stereotypes of certain historically disadvantaged groups is that they are unable to
responsibly manage large amounts of money); Goyal et al., supra note 3, at 1591 (noting
that most of the money kidney donors receive in payment for the donation is spent on
debt, food, and clothing).
438. Goyal et al., supra note 3, at 1591.
439. Walsh, supra note 223.
440. Id.
441. Telephone Interview with Sally Satel, supra note 433.
442. HINKLEY, supra note 376, at 111 (internal citation omitted); see also R.R. v.
M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796-97 (Mass. 1998) (holding that a surrogacy contract was void
because contrary to public policy, the "agreement was induced by the payment of money,"
and the mother was not given a reasonable amount of time after the birth of her child to
reflect on her decision to part with the child); Banks, supra note 387, at 87 ("Organ
providers in a commercial market should... be required to undergo a physical
examination to verify that they are healthy and that the proposed organ transplant will
not cause their death or an unreasonable diminished capacity of life."); Posting of Gary
Becker, supra note 162 (noting long waitlists drive family members to make impulsive
decisions regarding emergency organ donation).
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paternalism is certainly less than that of wholly prohibiting
kidney sales. Thus, all else being equal, this is a Pareto
improvement.
Critics thereafter express a legitimate apprehension that if a
market for the purchase of kidneys is allowed, creditors might
require debtors to sell a kidney.44 The concern that "[a] man with
a $50,000 kidney, like a man with $50,000 in the bank, would not
qualify for welfare"4" reflects similar considerations. These
issues, however, are easily addressed. The legislation legalizing
kidney sales could easily prohibit creditors from considering
debtors' kidneys' value, and the same for government evaluation
of applicants' qualification for welfare and similar programs.
Indeed, statutes routinely do this for much more mundane
assets. For example, many states have a homestead exemption
for bankruptcy petitioners, such that creditors can reach neither
a debtor's home nor the proceeds of its sale. 45 Under any
reasonably designed legal kidney sale regime, no person would
ever be compelled by law to sell a kidney, nor would qualifying
for any government services require an applicant to do so.
"Selling organs does involve an ethical problem [regarding
the poor], but it is one that relates to the general society and not
to the individual buyer or seller." 46 "It [may] reflect poorly on a
society that it allows a person to reach such a desperate state
that he [or she] must sell an organ to get out of financial debt or
obtain necessary medical services; but outlawing such sales will
not correct the underlying social inequities." 7 Wishing away
unpleasant choices does nothing to help the people who are in the
position to make those choices.
4. Distributional Concerns. One of the most common
objections to selling kidneys argues that such a system would
allow the rich to exploit the poor"8 because "the poor will both
give too many of their organs, and not have access to
transplants." 9 Accordingly, a Congressional Special Report
443. See TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 61.
444. Bernard M. Dickens, Morals and Legal Markets in Transplantable Organs, 2
HEALTH L.J. 121, 130 (1994).
445. See, e.g., In re Bading, 376 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2007).
446. Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 187.
447. Id.
448. Radcliffe-Richards et al., supra note 410, at 224. Donor exploitation is "the
single most important and widely deployed moral concept in the body commodification
debate." Watkins, supra note 12, at 33 (quoting WILKINSON, supra note 235, at 1).
449. Posting of Gary Becker, supra note 162; see also Weisman, supra note 386, at
616 (discussing the argument that creating a free market for organs in which the bodies of
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states the objection that organs would be sold by the poor only for
the benefit of the rich 4 '-with the costs borne exclusively by the
poor.45" ' For example, Nancy Scheper-Hughes, an anthropologist
who studies international kidney sales, argues that allowing
compensation for organ sales permits "one relatively privileged
population [to] claim property rights over the bodies of the
disadvantaged."5 2 But, the critical error in this reasoning is that
even if individuals have the opportunity to be paid for kidneys, it
does not follow that transplant recipients may buy kidneys on the
open market."' These represent two distinct issues. A regulated
system to buy kidneys, as discussed below, could be coupled with
a distribution scheme modeled after the existing method
currently employed by UNOS. One critical distinction, however,
of a kidney-for-sale system is that, while UNOS would continue
matching donors with recipients (this time living donors),'54 and
the payments would come from insurance schemes, the waitlist
for kidneys would likely be eliminated.
This discussion, however, raises a related concern about the
distributional equity of selling kidneys-whether permitting
kidney sales would actually create distributional benefits to the
historically underprivileged. Interestingly, permitting the sale of
kidneys will likely offer minorities greater access to kidneys.
Positive blood and antigen matching are more likely to occur
when the transplant donor and recipient are ethnically similar. 5
As a consequence, African Americans wait longer on the national
organ waitlist than any other ethnic group and are the most
likely to die while on the list (before ever receiving the
anticipated organ).456 In fact, they wait twice as long for a donor
the poor will be used as a stockpile of parts to supplement the bodies of the rich should be
prevented even in cases where the poor have given their consent).
450. U.S. CONGRESS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 175, at 76.
451. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 197 (propounding the concern of commentators
that in an organ market, while African Americans would comprise the majority of
donors, European Americans would make up a large number of the recipients);
Stimson, supra note 77, at 363 (acknowledging the argument that organ solicitation
will benefit those with the most money); see also Jeffrey P. Kahn, Is There a Difference
Between Selling Eggs and Selling Kidneys?, CTR. FOR BIOETHICS, May 1998,
http://www.bioethics.umn.edu/publications/ethics-matters.html (expressing concern about
the exploitation of potential donors).
452. Friedman & Friedman, supra note 5, at 961 (quoting National Organ
Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984)).
453. Gill & Sade, supra note 4, at 19.
454. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
455. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 199; Gaston et al., supra note 53, at 312 ("It is clear
that profound racial differences exist in antigen expression.").
456. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 44-45.
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kidney as European Americans do.457  African-American
candidates receive a perfectly matched kidney only about one-
tenth as often as European-American candidates do.4"6 The
waiting period for Hispanics and Asians is only slightly less
troubling than for African Americans.459 As a consequence,
minorities frequently lack the opportunity to receive a transplant
in the current altruistic system.46 °
The significance OPTN places on HLA matching limits racial
minorities from accessing all but a very small portion of the
kidney pool.461 OPTN still prioritizes HLA matching due to the
belief that antigen similarity between recipient and living related
transplant donor increases the chance for graft survival,462
notwithstanding recent evidence suggesting that the graft
survival rate does not fluctuate significantly depending on the
severity of antigen mismatch.463  While matching "is very
important, [it becomes] less important by the effective use of
anti-rejection drugs.' 64 This issue is subject to much debate.465
And, while other patients at high risk for antigen mismatch often
receive equity points that level the playing field by improving
access to renal transplantation despite their greater risk for graft
loss, African-American patients often do not.46  This is
particularly important because the need for transplant kidneys
among the African-American population is more disparate
relative to European Americans than for any other organ.6 7 Yet,
kidneys are the only organs for which OPTN strongly favors HLA
457. Id. at 45.
458. Id. at 103.
459. Asians wait approximately 1,550 days for an organ transplant, while Latinos
wait for about 1,357 days. Id. at 45.
460. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 331.
461. Gaston et al., supra note 53, at 312 ("[Using HLA matching to allocate kidneys
from a predominantly Caucasian donor population favors the Caucasian recipients and
places.., blacks at a disadvantage." (quoting V.A. Lazda & M.E. Blaesing, Is Allocation
of Kidneys on Basis of HLA Match Equitable in Multiracial Populations?, 21 TRANSPLANT
PROC. 1415, 1416 (1989))).
462. Id. at 314.
463. Id.
464. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 97 (quoting Telephone Interview with Jack Lynch,
Community Affairs Director, Gift of Hope (July 7, 2005)). UNOS awards points to
candidates based on HLA matching under the theory that it reduces the risk of organ
rejection. However, advancements in antirejection medicines make this reasoning less
persuasive. Id. at 97-99.
465. Id. Some doctors argue that 80% of African Americans could receive a kidney
transplant from the general population. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 355.
466. Gaston et al., supra note 53, at 316-17.
467. Id. at 308.
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matching as part of the allocation criteria.468 "By doing so, Blacks
are institutionally shut out in an altruistic system based on
genetic or biological criteria that they could not possibly
overcome '4 69 however invalid those concerns may remain given
advances in anti-rejection drugs.
Moreover, African Americans disproportionately suffer from
ESRD; whereas African Americans make up approximately
twelve percent of the general population, they represent thirty-
four percent of patients waiting to receive a kidney transplant.
470
And even though African Americans currently represent thirty-
four percent of patients suffering from ESRD in need of a kidney
transplant, they make up only about twelve percent of all organ
donors.47' This mismatch particularly impacts the African-
American community because, as discussed, the OPTN effectively
requires that many African Americans receive a kidney from
another African American in order to qualify for a transplant in
the current altruistic system.
Therefore, while there is apprehension that offering
payment to kidney donors will exploit historically
underprivileged members of society, converting from the
altruistic model to a market organ system may actually help
alleviate some of the allocation inequities currently existing
along ethnic lines under UNOS policies.4 72 Because positive blood
and antigen matching frequently occurs when the transplant
donor and recipient are ethnically similar, African Americans
would likely benefit from a kidney-for-sale system.472
5. The Concern that Legalizing the Sale of Kidneys Will
Result in a Decrease in Kidney Quality. Another concern is that
allowing payments for kidneys would increase the number of
468. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 97-98. The UNOS ranking system at one time gave
points equally to patients for "time waiting, antigen matching, antibody analyses, medical
urgency, and logistic practicality." However, the UNOS Board "subordinated all other
factors of kidney allocation (including credit for time waiting) to HLA matching." Id. at 98
(quoting Thomas E. Starzl & John J. Fung, The Politics of Grafting Cadaver Kidneys, 348
LANCET 454, 454-55 (1996)).
469. Goodwin, supra note 6, at 352.
470. Gaston et al., supra note 53, at 313. Nationally, African Americans represent
34% of patients with ESRD, but only 12% of the general population. In Alabama, African
Americans represent 65% of patients on the waitlist for a kidney transplant, but only 24%
of the general population. Id.
471. GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 105.
472. See id. at 198 (revealing that biological materials benefiting all ethnic groups
are sold throughout the United States everyday).
473. Id. at 199.
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poor-quality organs by attracting unhealthy donors.47 4 Critics
argue that "persons who do not now choose to donate their organs
but who would respond to financial incentives to sell those organs
would, on average, have organs of lower quality than those now
donated."
475
This contention remains highly questionable. Living-donor
transplant kidneys already must be screened because even
charitable donors might carry unhealthy kidneys and disease,
and cadaveric kidneys are donated by virtually anonymous
donors.476 Moreover, even if the concern proved valid, the
economic incentive would likely improve screening. Blood
screening was less stringent when blood banks sought to avoid
paying blood donors, 477 and fertility clinics test the sperm and ova
they buy-in part out of a fear of legal liability.
478
Moreover, because compensating donors would increase the
number of kidneys available for transplants, this could actually
improve the average quality of transplants. 479 As a result of the
enormity of the waitlist today, UNOS greatly relaxed the
standards for qualifying kidneys. With a greater supply, UNOS
could discard the suboptimal kidneys that it currently accepts for
transplantation.
6. The Concern that Legalizing the Sale of Kidneys Will
Result in Excessive Risk to Kidney Sellers. Some express a
concern that kidney sellers expose themselves to inordinate
risk.4 80 However, it is inconsistent to oppose offering donors
474. Weisman, supra note 386, at 616.
475. Robinson, supra note 71, at 1043 (quoting Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the
Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures Market in Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
21(1994)).
476. See Beard & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 838 (noting that transplant centers test
and examine organs to assess organ quality before transplanting the organ into a
patient); Weisman, supra note 386, at 617 ("[Tjhe risk involved in people selling
unhealthy body parts can be contained by means of thorough medical examination of the
'donors.'").
477. See Ronald E. Domen, Paid-Versus-Volunteer Blood Donation in the United
States: A Historical Review, 9 TRANSFUSION MED. REVS. 53, 55-56 (1995) (noting
increased screening of paid donors and that blood from some paid-donor banks was of
higher quality than that from full-volunteer donor banks).
478. See U.S. CONGRESS SPECIAL REPORT, supra note 175, at 77 ("Insemination with
sperm containing a genetic defect could... result in substantial liability.").
479. Andrew H. Barnett et al., Improving Organ Donation: Compensation Versus
Markets, in THE ETHICS OF ORGAN TRANSPLANTS: THE CURRENT DEBATE, supra note 53,
at 208, 215; see also supra text accompanying note 161 (noting that the shortage of
kidneys has resulted in doctors accepting "marginal" kidneys).
480. See Banks, supra note 387, at 82-83 ("Safeguards are needed to protect
vulnerable organ participants... ."); Radcliffe-Richards et al., supra note 410, at 225-26
(introducing and addressing arguments made that organ sellers are exposed to excessive
[45:51594
2009] KIDNEYS, CASH, & KASHRUT 1595
payment for risking their health when the highly esteemed
altruistic-donor system presents exactly the same risk.41' If the
risks associated with donating a kidney are so great that society
believes taking the risk would make donors worse off despite
receiving compensation for the risk and inconvenience, then it
logically follows that the risks must also be too great for unpaid
donors to accept.482  Offering payment does not make the
transplant any more dangerous. 483 Even some opponents of a
kidney-sale system concede that they cannot "plausibly argue
that retrieving organs from living sellers is too risky.
4 84
A donor's risk of perioperative mortality is only about
0.03%,481 much lower than other high-risk, but perfectly
acceptable, activities for people to engage in such as "mining,
construction work, or deep sea diving."86 "[R]isk-conscious
insurance companies do not raise their rates for kidney
donors,"87 under the recognition that donating (or selling) a
kidney is not considered a significant risk. The paired existence
of kidneys in the donor's body creates a reserve capacity with
functioning far exceeding what the body needs to filter waste,
such that removal of one kidney imposes a very low risk to the
donor's health. 8 In fact, the surgical procedure for removing a
kidney equals roughly the same risk to the donor as any basic
operation.9 Two to three percent of kidney donors experience
serious, but temporary, injury as a result of the nephrectomy, the
most common health complications being minor wound
risks); Weisman, supra note 386, at 616 (arguing that a person cannot truly consent to
selling a kidney for economic reasons).
481. Gill & Sade, supra note 4, at 21-22.
482. Beard & Kaserman, supra note 3, at 835.
483. Watkins, supra note 12, at 30-31.
484. HINKLEY, supra note 376, at 110.
485. TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 126; Anderson, supra note 28, at 280-81 (stating
that "[a]bout twenty people are thought to have died as a direct consequence of donating a
kidney"); Kunin, supra note 298, at 269 (noting that a kidney donation from a healthy
person is "well accepted medically because it entails extremely low risk to the donor");
Levey et al., supra note 69, at 50 (reporting that donor death during a nephrectomy is
extremely rare, occurring in just 0.03% of operations, that is, in one out of 3,200 donors);
Matas et al., supra note 143, at 435 (identifying pulmonary embolism as the most common
cause of the deaths associated with kidney donation).
486. See Watkins, supra note 12, at 31.
487. HINKLEY, supra note 376, at 110 (quoting David Rothman, The International
Organ Traffic, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 26, 1998, at 15).
488. Halperin, supra note 39, at 45; see also Kunin, supra note 298, at 270 (citing
minimal risks of kidney removal).
489. See Halperin, supra note 39, at 47 (noting that the danger to donors "does not
substantially exceed... the small risks of... a simple operation"); Psst, Wanna Buy a
Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15 (assuring that removing a kidney is at least as safe as
liposuction).
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infections, pulmonary and urinary tract infections, and low-grade
fever.49 ° Donors are typically discharged from the hospital within
four days after the procedure and are able to return to work
within six weeks."' In addition, long-term follow-up studies
contradict anecdotal reports alleging that living kidney donors
experience increased rate of renal failure.492 In fact, properly
screened kidney donors appear to outlive the average person with
two kidneys.49 A large-scale study just released concludes that
the life span of kidney donors is similar to that of persons
who have not donated a kidney. The risk of ESRD does not
appear to be increased among donors, and their current
health seems to be similar to that of the general population.
These outcomes may be a direct consequence of the routine
screening of donors for important health conditions related
to kidney disease at the time of donation.494
Donor risks could be reduced even more if transplant centers
would implement stricter donor screening guidelines and take
more thorough prophylactic measures.499 And the very best way
to ensure donor safety is to decriminalize kidney sales so that
donors and recipients no longer feel compelled to transact kidney
490. Levey et al., supra note 69, at 50; Matas et al., supra note 143, at 435.
491. Matas et al., supra note 143, at 435.
492. Id.; see also Kunin, supra note 298, at 270 (noting that in a twenty-year follow-
up study of kidney donors, indications of possible renal disease, including abnormal
creatinine clearance, hypertension, and proteinuria, were comparable with that of donors'
siblings).
493. Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15.
494. Hassan N. Ibrahim, Long-Term Consequences of Kidney Donation, 360 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 459, 466-67 (2009).
Kidney transplantation, particularly from a living donor, is the treatment
of choice for most patients with end-stage renal disease (ESRD). The superior
results achieved with kidney transplantation from living donors have resulted in
an increase in this method of transplantation.
The life expectancy of kidney donors appears to be similar to that of
nondonors or perhaps even longer, as suggested by one study. However, at least
two reports have described donors in the United States who were subsequently
placed on the waiting list for kidney transplantation. Although the risk of ESRD
among donors does not appear to be increased, and although cross-sectional
studies have reported no major elevations in serum creatinine levels for up to 30
years after donation, such studies estimated the glomerular filtration rate (GFR)
from the serum creatinine concentration, and the length of the follow-up period
and the number of subjects studied were relatively limited. The present study
ascertained vital status and the risk of ESRD in a large number of kidney donors
and compared their health status with that of controls. To overcome the
limitations of previous studies, kidney function was formally assessed by
measurement of the GFR and urinary albumin excretion in 255 donors who had
donated kidneys 3 to 45 years before the study began.
Id. at 460 (internal citations omitted).
495. Watkins, supra note 12, at 30.
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transplants underground.496 This would allow kidney sales to
avoid the generally lower-quality medical facilities of less-
developed countries, where patients are often presented with
risks that they could readily avoid in American hospitals."'
IV. PROPOSED NATIONAL KIDNEY-SALES SYSTEM
The demand curve for kidneys is highly price-inelastic, 98
particularly given that: (1) patients generally have government
or private insurance that substantially covers most ESRD
treatment; (2) untreated ESRD is fatal; and (3) patients
recognize that dialysis is not a viable long-term treatment. As a
consequence, the shortage of available kidneys is supply-side.
Preventing kidney sales, which effectively caps the purchase
price at zero, dramatically reduces that supply.99 In fact, while
many people might not be motivated by payment to donate a
kidney, sales from only slightly more than half of 0.1% of healthy
Americans between sixteen and sixty-five would completely
eliminate the waitlist. °0 And once the current backlog of patients
needing a kidney transplant has been eliminated, only the far
smaller number of new kidney-transplant patients would need to
be cleared each year.5"'
To demonstrate this point, simply compare America's
transplant kidney shortage to human egg shortages for fertility
treatments in other countries. In England, for example, where
statute caps donor payment for eggs at £250, recipients wait
years.0 2 In Australia, where the law prohibits paying donors for
eggs, recipients wait for approximately five years.5 ' However, in
America, where women receive a market price for their eggs,
which averages between $5,000 and $15,000, no waitlist exists at
496. Id.
497. Telephone Interview with Sally Satel, supra note 433.
498. See Becker & Elias, supra note 3, at 18-19 ("[Olnce a market for organs is in
place, the actual demand would surpass present demand.. .
499. Volokh, supra note 29, at 1833.
500. Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15; see also Volokh, supra note 29,
at 1834 n.98 ("CElven if the prospect of payment motivates only 0.01% of adult Americans
to sell an organ each year, that would still bring an extra 25,000 organs into the system
every year-likely enough to clear out the waiting list.").
501. Kaserman, supra note 115, at 572.
502. See Posting of Eugene Volokh to The Volokh Conspiracy, Medical Self-Defense
and the Risk that Compensation for Organs Will Drive Away Volunteers,
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all.0 4  Simply, price caps create supply-side shortages. 5
Moreover, given the presence of public and private insurance,
and the gravity of the need for kidneys for ESRD patients, the
shortfall of available kidneys is not typically a function of ability
or willingness to pay-it is a consequence of an insufficient
number of donors willing to provide kidneys without any
compensation.
Iran has legalized the sale of kidneys,"' making it the only
country in which the opportunity to receive a kidney transplant
is open to all patients, regardless of their economic status or
educational background.0 7 The waitlist there for kidneys has
been completely eliminated,"8 which is especially significant
because the Iranian theocratic government, perhaps ironically,
has outlawed cadaveric kidney donations.509 Between 1988 and
2000, the Iranian government procured more than 8,400 organs
from living, nonrelated donors.510 This model is a state-sponsored
transplantation program" through which transactions are
supervised by an officially approved patients' organization. 2
There are no middlemen and the transaction is transparent.5"3
Donors receive between $2,000 and $4,000 for each kidney.1 4
Whereas Iranian transplant surgeons were shunned by the
international medical community just a few years ago, now they
receive invitations to major conferences around the world and
publish their findings in peer-reviewed journals.515
504. Id.
505. See Abecassis et al., supra note 359, at 2925 (noting that the reason for
considering monetary payment for live organ donations would be to increase supply);
Rohter, supra note 9 (stating that some "transplant surgeons... believe that a good way
to remedy the shortage of organs would be to offer payments"); see also Friedman &
Friedman, supra note 5, at 961 (reporting that some transplant surgeons believe that a
regulated system of selling kidneys would prevent as many as 100,000 deaths each year).
506. Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15.
507. Daar, supra note 9, at 600.
508. Daar, supra note 9, at 600; Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15.
This is true despite the insistence by Muslim authorities that cadaveric organs may be
used for transplants only if the deceased agreed in advance to the donation. Chris Hedges,
Egyptian Doctors Limit Kidney Transplants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1992, at A5.
509. Becker & Elias, supra note 3, at 12 (stating that the Iranian government
outlawed cadaveric kidney donations because they say the Koran does not permit it).
510. TAYLOR, supra note 384, at 176.
511. Daar, supra note 9, at 600 ("The Iranian model [implements a] state-sponsored,
transparent, noncommercial, middleman-free kidney transplantation, whereby donors are
paid by a government-sponsored agency....").
512. Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15.
513. Daar, supra note 9, at 600.
514. Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15.
515. Daar, supra note 9, at 600.
KIDNEYS, CASH, & KASHRUT
Iran is not the only example. Israel is currently considering
whether to compensate people for donating their organs."6 A bill
before the Knesset-the Israeli parliament-proposes allowing
organ donors to receive payment in exchange for providing a
kidney for a lifesaving transplant."7 The protocol would order the
Israeli National Transplant Center, rather than the recipient, to
pay the donor so that individuals of all economic backgrounds
have an equal opportunity to receive unrelated donor kidneys.51
Israeli national health insurance already pays the cost for foreign
transplants-which often includes payment for organ
donations. 19
Based on this economic analysis and with these examples as
a reference point, I propose a UNOS-controlled kidney-
procurement compensation system (the "UNOS-Procurement
System").52° Specifically, the UNOS-Procurement System contains
the following features:
1. Empower UNOS-and only UNOS-to purchase
kidneys from donors at a market price above a
statutorily set minimum.
2. Restrict directed donations to related donors and
those with an existing relationship to the recipient.
3. Provide payment over several years.
4. Provide donors lifetime government-funded
supplemental health insurance.
5. Impose a minimum waiting period that a potential
donor would have to wait before selling kidney.
6. Permit sellers to rescind the agreement at any time
before surgery.
7. Require sellers to be a minimum age.
8. Require medical screening and independent
oversight.
516. Id. at 600-01.
517. Id.; see also Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 185 (stating that for the
first time, the Israel Health Ministry is preparing legislation that would allow payment to
be given to kidney donors).
518. Grazi & Wolowelsky, supra note 168, at 187.
519. Andrew Batson & Shai Oster, Change of Heart: China Reconsiders Fairness of
'Transplant Tourism,' WALL ST. J., Apr. 6, 2007, at Al.
520. Of course, my proposal employs elements from many other proposals. See, e.g.,
Banks, supra note 387, at 86 (arguing for a twenty-four hour waiting period for organ
donations); Finkel, supra note 3, at 52 (discussing foreign countries, in particular Iraq,
with successful organ sale markets); Posting of Gary Becker, supra note 162 (calling for a
market-determined organ price system).
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9. Prohibit creditors from considering the value of debtors'
kidneys--essentially a "homestead exemption" for
kidneys.
10. Exempt the potential value of kidneys from
government evaluation of applicants' qualification for
welfare and similar programs.
A. Empower UNOS-and Only UNOS-to Purchase Kidneys
Arguments opposing a market system for selling transplant
kidneys commonly employ the invalid assumption that if donors
can sell kidneys, then potential recipients can buy kidneys
directly from them. 21 This need not be the case. For example, in
the existing system for supplying blood products, donors sell
blood products to blood banks, but recipients do not buy blood
products directly from donors. Of course, since we generally do
not have a shortage of blood products-because we supplement
the altruistic system with a compensation regime-individuals
generally do not even seek to buy blood products privately.
Under the UNOS-Procurement System, kidneys would be
traded in a regulated market-like blood products-where, even
though kidney donors are paid, recipients could not buy kidneys
from donors. Since ESRD patients would not face shortages in a
kidney-sale regime given that the market would clear any
shortages, patients would have no need or motive to purchase
kidneys outside the regulated system. The problem of allocating
organs according to the relative economic ability of the patient
simply would no longer present an issue in a regulated market
wherein an agency acquires transplant kidneys and allocates
them according to patient need.522
Under the UNOS-Procurement System, live-donor kidneys
would be allocated no differently than cadaveric organs-UNOS
would distribute them by the quality of the donor-patient match
and the immediacy of the patient's need.23 As a consequence,
521. See Gill & Sade, supra note 4, at 19 (proposing that federal agencies, rather
than individual recipients, could be responsible for paying kidney donors).
522. See Volokh, supra note 29, at 1840 ("Such a system would actually decrease the
advantages rich patients have.").
523. Gill & Sade, supra note 4, at 19 (observing that the system for allocating blood
products is similar; a donor may receive compensation for helping to provide blood
products, but the recipient is chosen regardless of his or her economic status); see also
Finkel, supra note 3, at 31 (relating the relative ease of successfully matching kidneys).
Even without a waitlist, UNOS would likely need several weeks to coordinate non-
emergent transfers. Some patients will inevitably present the need for an emergency
transplant. In these circumstances, under the UNOS-Procurement System, UNOS would
"fast track" these patients.
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"[not only will donors, many of whom are poor, be paid, but
recipients will face a much larger number of organs available for
transplantation, thereby eliminating incentives for
discrimination that currently exists in the allocation process. 24
Under the UNOS-Procurement System, instead of maintaining a
list of dying patients--only some of whom will be saved-UNOS
would maintain a list of contracted donors, and UNOS would
contact them upon an expressed need from a transplant
hospital.25
Further, like the current U.S. blood-collection system, under
the UNOS-Procurement System, the donor and patient remain
total strangers. Recipients often highly value anonymity, as it
removes the sense of enormous personal and ongoing obligation
that many recipients feel towards revealed living donors. 26
Equally, recipients can expand the pool of potential donors
beyond the one that they currently aspire, often in vain, to get.
5 27
This allows for quality selectivity as well.
B. Restrict Directed Donations to Related Donors and Those with
an Existing Relationship to the Recipient
The current kidney-collection and distribution system is in
jeopardy of becoming irrelevant, if not worse.528 Living-donor
transplants already roughly mirror cadaveric transplants,529 with
living donors completely bypassing the need criteria of UNOS.
Donors determine who receives their kidneys, not UNOS.
Supporters of the status quo suggest that these altruistic donors
would not otherwise donate, and therefore the inequity of a
distribution scheme that bypasses the UNOS criteria does not
harm those remaining on the waitlist.53'
However, as services such as matchingdonor.com serve to
increase the number of unconnected living donations, this
argument loses force. 3' If these donors are unconnected to the
524. Kaserman, supra note 115, at 577.
525. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
526. Telephone Interview with Sally Satel, supra note 433.
527. Telephone Interview with Jim Cohan, supra note 91.
528. See supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text (discussing objections to the
current UNOS system that discourages solicitation of stranger donors).
529. See GOODWIN, supra note 4, at 41 (noting that living kidney donation surpassed
cadaveric kidney donations in 2001).
530. Alexandra K. Glazier & Scott Sasjack, Should It Be Illicit to Solicit? A Legal
Analysis of Policy Options to Regulate Solicitation of Organs for Transplant, 17 HEALTH
MATRIX 63, 68 (2007).
531. See supra notes 195-202 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns
associated with donor-recipient Internet solicitation).
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recipient, then their motivations to donate are truly altruistic-
and that should survive even if UNOS became the collector of
their charity on behalf of those most in need.
532
Moreover, if any of these matching services results in
undisclosed payments to donors, then an underground market
already exists without any of the protections of the UNOS-
Procurement System. By restricting directed donations to donors
and recipients in close relationships, the UNOS-Procurement
System will redirect the truly altruistic donors to those who most
need kidneys, thereby meeting the needs of all future recipients
in a short time, and restoring the fairness otherwise lost in our
current bifurcated system.
Indeed, the current system embodies an even more insidious
inequity. Patients who can afford an overseas transplant need
only prepay $90,000 for a kidney transplant, and within several
weeks they will be on their way to a foreign transplant facility. 3
This payment includes all charges-even the cost of flying and
housing a companion with the patient.534 While these black
market transactions potentially free up cadaveric kidneys for
those whose economic status forces them to remain on the UNOS
waitlist, the ability of the well-off to pursue these foreign
transplants likely reduces the political pressure for change from
the status quo from the patients with the loudest voices (as
measured by wealth). As such, the wishes and needs of the
disenfranchised will remain unmet-while the needs of the
empowered will remain satisfied through international,
extrajudicial means.
C. Price Floor
The UNOS-Procurement System requires a minimum price
for a kidney. This mimics a minimum wage and presents the
attendant debate as to whether restricting the ability of workers
to contract at any wage ultimately helps or harms them.3 ' While
a price floor for a kidney could be set via various methods,536 I
532. See Glazier & Sasjack, supra note 530, at 63 (pointing out that people in need of
organs have been appealing to the public "as far back as the early 1980s" and citing
examples of public appeals).
533. Telephone Interview with Jim Cohan, supra note 91.
534. Id.
535. The debate is whether the paternalism of a minimum wage assists workers by
transferring to workers the economic surplus that labor purchasers enjoy as a result of
market inefficiencies, or whether a minimum wage forecloses employment options from
those who need it the most. Cf RIcHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 342-44
(7th ed. 2007) (discussing the effects of unionization on prices, wages, and output).
536. See Dickens, supra note 444, at 130-31 (proposing that a provincial health plan
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recommend using an economic projection of a kidney's value that
considers the costs and risks of the surgery and the average
utility of income. Individual sellers willing to take a price below
that minimum might reflect inefficiencies in the market or
inappropriate factors affecting the sellers' price calculus. The
price floor will ensure that those sellers are not undervalued. Of
course, price floors have a cost, i.e., the possibility that the
minimum price results in a continued shortage. This will depend
on whether the economic model sets a price below or above the
market price. While I believe that it will be the former-
therefore, avoiding any shortage-should the latter occur, the
value of the floor would have to be balanced against its benefits.
The determination of the floor is not a theoretical curiosity.
Gary Becker, a Nobel Prize-winning economist from the
University of Chicago, and his colleague, Julio Elias,
recommended a price of $45,000 for a living donor kidney. 37 This
calculation was based on the following assumptions:
1. A mean American salary of $40,000 per year.
2. An average life value of $3 million.
3. A nephrectomy mortality rate of one percent, which is
much higher than it actually is.
4. A reduction in the quality of the donor's life by five
percent-also an overestimate.
5. A loss of $7,000 in income due to the donor from the
surgery.
538
Substituting the nephrectomy death risk at one in three
hundred, which is still over ten times the actual risk, reduces the
kidney purchase price to $20,000,"39 which is where I would set the
price minimum. To be clear, the market could-and I believe likely
would-set a price far above this. But under the UNOS-
Procurement System, UNOS could not provide less than this price.
Once the price is set, implementation proves simple-given
that the UNOS-Procurement System maps onto the existing
UNOS structure. As such, under the UNOS-Procurement
System, the Department of Health and Human Services covers
administrative costs, and the recipient's insurance company and
Medicare's ESRD Program cover donor incentive payments-
calculate the reward to donors by evaluating the costs associated with dialysis treatment
and subtracting the savings associated with an earlier transplantation).





much like they currently do for ESRD treatment.54 ° UNOS would
charge the kidneys to the transplant hospitals, which would then
bill the recipient's insurance company or Medicare's ESRD
program. While these programs already cover most ESRD
payments, savings from avoiding extended costs associated with
dialysis would easily fund any currently uncovered costs and,
likely, any remaining uncovered patients, as well.541 One analysis
shows that, were each dialysis patient currently on the national
waitlist to receive a kidney transplant from a paid donor, "society
could break even while paying $90,000 [to every] kidney
vendor."4 2 Another study asserts even greater savings."'
D. Provide Payment over Several Years; Lifetime Government-
Funded Supplemental Health Insurance; Minimum Waiting
Period; and Seller's Right to Rescind the Agreement
The annuity and lifetime supplemental health insurance44
essentially determine how the donor spends her compensation. 45
This apparent paternalism directly responds to the concerns,
described above, that donors essentially cannot be trusted to
make sound decisions in spending their compensation and in
deciding whether to sell a kidney. In a free society and free
market system such an approach raises suspicion, but rebuttably
SO.
The supplemental health insurance would only cover what
the donor does not already receive from private insurance or
Medicare. Thus, the overall cost would not reach the cost of fully
insuring all donors, and would not dramatically impact the cash
remuneration that donors would receive.546 Moreover, the
uninsured and underinsured impose significant externalities on
540. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1122-24.
541. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text (discussing the costs associated
with dialysis).
542. Arthurs, supra note 8, at 1119 (emphasis added) (quoting Arthur J. Matas &
Mark Schnitzler, Payment for Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis, 4 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 216,216 (2004)).
543. Calandrillo, supra note 82, at 118 (showing that studies indicate insurance
savings would be between $200,000 and $400,000 in insurance costs).
544. See supra notes 440-43 and accompanying text (setting forth certain procedures
that could eliminate the problem of people spending money received from kidney
donations unwisely).
545. Telephone Interview with Sally Satel, supra note 433.
546. A current debate exists over whether government-provided health insurance
will "squeeze out" private health insurance-at the expense of taxpayers. See Maxwell J.
Mehlman, "Medicover" A Proposal for National Health Insurance, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 1,
12 (2007) (discussing the adverse effects of voluntary public health programs). The small
scale of the proposal in this Article will have no significant squeeze-out effect.
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the insured and taxpayers in our highly regulated system. As a
consequence, fee shifting no longer constitutes outright
paternalism, but rather imposes an equitable redistribution of
expenditures onto those actually incurring costs.
While the argument for the forced supplemental insurance
has an economic basis, the mandatory annuity and minimum
waiting period fall squarely within paternalism. The reduction in
free choice directly responds to the concerns that donors cannot
be trusted to spend wisely and will be "unfairly" lured by quick
compensation. The cost to freedom of such restrictions-in
exchange for the elimination of deaths caused by ESRD-seems
acceptable.
Finally, entitling sellers to rescind the agreement at any
time before surgery offsets some of the aforementioned
paternalism of the UNOS-Procurement System by removing
UNOS's and potential-recipients' right to sue donors for breach of
contract. The purpose of the restriction is to ensure that donors
have full freedom to constantly reevaluate their choices without
the encumbrance of a potential lawsuit by either UNOS or donors
claiming rights in the purchase contracts as third party
beneficiaries.
Because UNOS, not would-be recipients, will be contracting
with the donors, no individual will likely be prejudiced by those
who withdraw prior to consummating the transaction, because if
a seller rescinded, UNOS would simply approach the next seller
on its contract list that matches the recipient to complete the
transaction. At worst, this restriction may result in some
administrative inconvenience to UNOS. And while the
anonymity of the UNOS-Procurement System makes third party
beneficiary claims likely not pursuable-legally or factually-the
immunity granted by this provision resolves the question
completely. This reduces litigation risks and costs.
E. Exempt Creditors and Government from Considering the
Value of Debtors' Kidneys for the Purposes of Debt Obligation
and Welfare Qualification
Donors should be free to choose whether they want to pursue
welfare programs or insolvency without having to first exhaust
their ability to monetize kidneys.547 Given the unique nature of
this transaction, it should not be forced upon anyone. However,
547. See supra notes 443-45 and accompanying text (addressing the concern that




this concern, while valid, overstates any real problem. Currently,
as discussed, individuals can sell "tissue," and I have found no
cases in which debtors were required to do so as part of any
insolvency proceeding, pursuant to any contract to satisfy a debt,
or as a requirement to provide collateral for any transaction or
meet qualifying standards for any social welfare program.
Indeed, any attempt to do so would highly likely be found
unenforceable as against public policy.
48
F. Require Sellers to Be a Minimum Age, Medical Screening,
and Independent Oversight
Corruption often accompanies money. A well-devised
government program hopes for the best and safeguards against
the worst. Undoubtedly, with a proposal to sell kidneys, the
potential for abuse exists. The program would need institutional
protections, such as requiring sellers to be a minimum age,
medical screening, and independent oversight. These, however,
do not exhaust the list of precautions. Under the UNOS-
Procurement System, the Health and Human Services
Administration would oversee UNOS and would be empowered to
establish reasonable regulations to ensure safety and equity to
patients and donors alike.
For example, the UNOS-Procurement System would prohibit
children from contracting to sell one of their organs and would
prohibit their parents or legal guardians from contracting on
their behalf.549 Such regulation would "alleviate fears of children
being conceived solely for the purpose of growing organs."55 ° The
UNOS-Procurement System would also require donor medical
and psychosocial examinations.55' Sellers would be properly
checked for disease and drug use prior to donation and would
receive proper follow-up medical care after the operation.552
V. CONCLUSION
An Orthodox rabbi once told me that, as heretical as it may
be, he saw no purpose in death. While this is a topic of some
548. See supra note 289-91 and accompanying text (discussing McFall v. Shimp, in
which the court found that requiring an invasion of a person's body without his or her
consent was against public policy).
549. Harris & Alcorn, supra note 10, at 232.
550. Id.
551. Friedman & Friedman, supra note 5, at 961.
552. Psst, Wanna Buy a Kidney?, supra note 10, at 15; see also Becker & Elias, supra
note 3, at 21 (assuring that the kidneys of individuals "who use drugs or have AIDS,
hepatitis, or other serious illnesses would be rejected").
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discourse in religious studies, few if any would dispute that
needless death should be avoided. This paper has presented an
exegesis of the current tragedy of needless deaths resulting from
the inability of our medical system to address kidney failure. The
Article's proposed solution-the UNOS-Procurement System-
will provide kidneys to those who need them and compensate
donors for their charitable acts. Like the rabbi's statement, this
proposal will undoubtedly engender significant controversy.
Hopefully, it will also result in a solution that benefits everyone.
